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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays on taxation. The first essay exam-
ines whether government policy, through the use of tax incentives, is able
to encourage household savings. This essay analyzes the impact of the 1990
Education Savings Bond Program. This policy created an additional tax in-
centive for owners of existing government savings bonds, by allowing interest
earnings to be exempt from income taxes in years where the household incurs
a qualified education expense. Using the 1989 and 1992 Survey of Consumer
Finance data sets, a difference-in-difference methodology is used to measure
how household savings has changed over time for households with college-
bound children as opposed to those without. Households without college-
bound children do not need to save for education and thus are not affected
by the program. The comparison of savings for the two groups, correcting
for individual characteristics, reveals the impact of the Education Savings
Bond Program. In addition, this procedure allows one to infer if there has
been a crowding out effect due to the Education Savings Bond Program. The
results indicate that the policy has not had an effect on household savings.
The second essay uses two different estimation procedures to calculate the
incidence of environmental taxes and compares the results. Both estimation
procedures assume non-separability of leisure and so the labor response is
incorporated into estimates of household behavior. The first method is the
Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) model of Deaton and Muellbauer. The
AIDS model assumes linear Engel curves and if this assumption is violated
then welfare estimates are biased. The Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand
System (QUAIDS) model of Banks, Blundell and Lewbel extends the AIDS
model to allow for non-linear Engel curves. Households consume three goods
– a composite clean good, a composite energy good and leisure. Data on
household consumption is from the Interview Survey component of the Con-
sumer Expenditure Survey. The AIDS model finds the energy good and
ii
leisure to be substitutes while the QUAIDS model finds no relationship be-
tween the two goods. Moreover the AIDS model is found to overestimate the
welfare loss of environmental taxes on low-income households but underesti-
mate the welfare loss of environmental taxes on high-income households.
The third essay again uses the Almost Ideal Demand System model of
Deaton and Muellbauer to estimate demand for junk food as well as cal-
culate the incidence of taxes on junk food. The model assumes households
consume three goods – a composite healthy food good, a composite unhealthy
food good (junk food) and a composite nonfood good. Data on household
consumption is from the Diary Survey component of the Consumer Expendi-
ture Survey. The Diary Survey collects detailed data on food expenditures.
Price data consists of price indices for various commodities which is available
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The compensated own-price elasticities
indicate that both healthy food and junk food have inelastic demand. In ad-
dition, healthy food and junk food are found to be substitutes. The elasticity
values found are consistent with the literature.
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CHAPTER 1
EDUCATION SAVINGS BONDS AND
SAVINGS BEHAVIOR
1.1 Introduction
The Education Savings Bond Program, implemented in 1990, is a policy
that allows households to exempt interest income if government savings bond
owners have qualified higher education expenses in the same year the bonds
are redeemed. This policy does not create a new class of savings bonds but
rather creates an additional tax incentive. Previously, government savings
bonds featured tax-free accrual of interest income. The new incentive is
the ability to exempt this interest income from taxation. The question is
how did households respond to this policy? Did savings bonds become more
attractive to households, and if so is this at the expense of other assets?
There has been an extensive debate on the ability of the government to
motivate savings behavior through the use of tax incentives. Individual retire-
ment accounts, IRAs, and 401(k) plans were created to encourage retirement
saving since the low saving rate threatened the financial health of retired
households. The federal government created the Coverdell Education Sav-
ings Accounts and the states created 529 savings plans to address the ability
of middle-class households to handle rising higher education costs.
The difficulty in identifying the effectiveness of saving incentives arises from
the inability to control for individual specific saving behavior, which causes
certain households to be high savers. Research on the effectiveness of IRA
and 401(k) plans has consistently shown that contributors have higher savings
than non-contributors, yet one must be cautious in interpreting contributions
as new saving. IRA and 401(k) contributors have higher propensities to save
and thus would be expected to have larger asset balances.
In this study, the 1989 and 1992 Survey of Consumer Finance data sets
are pooled together in order to use a difference-in-difference methodology to
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identify the policy effect. The method examines how the difference in house-
hold savings, between households with college-bound children and households
without college-bound children, has changed over the 1989-1992 time period.
The identification strategy behind this methodology is based on two random
sources of variation – the policy being implemented in 1990 and the pol-
icy only affecting households with college-bound children. The key to this
identification strategy is the assumption that whether a household is in the
treatment or control group is independent of their propensity to save. There-
fore whether one is a high saver or low saver should be independent of having
college-bound children. The data indicates that the saving behavior of the
two groups is similar prior to 1990.
The result is that the 1992 difference between the two groups, net of the
1989 difference, is the effect of the Education Savings Bond Program. The
same rationale allows one to use the difference-in-difference methodology to
infer what indirect impact the Education Savings Bond Program has had on
other assets such as stocks, bonds, mutual funds and money market accounts.
The results indicate that households did not respond to the policy; there is no
significant change in the difference in asset balances between the treatment
and control group. This includes an analysis of the household bond portfolio
which seems the most plausible source of substitution. In addition focusing
the analysis on households who would be financially literate does not reveal
a policy effect. This includes households who already own savings bonds and
therefore would be most likely to respond to this policy since they already
have a taste for savings bonds. The drawback in the Education Savings Bond
Program seems to be that it targets a financial asset that is not widely held
by households. In addition the incentive lacks “bite” because the tax savings
for the average household, from being able to exempt interest income, is
modest due to the small amount held in savings bonds.
1.2 Saving Incentives and Theory
1.2.1 Retirement and Education Saving Incentives
Government savings bonds are one of several investment securities offered by
the government, the others being Treasury bills, bonds and notes. There are
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two types of government savings bonds – series EE and series I.1 The interest
rate for series I is based on the inflation rate, while for series EE bonds it
is a variable market-based rate based on 5-year U.S. Treasuries.2 Although
federal income taxes must be paid on the interest income, it can be deferred
until the bonds are redeemed or until final maturity. This deferral of interest
income taxes is one benefit over Treasury bills, bonds and notes.
The Education Savings Bond Program does not create a new class of sav-
ings bonds, but rather allows the owners of series EE or series I bonds to
exempt the interest income from federal income taxes. In order to claim the
exemption, either the bondholder, spouse or dependant has to have a quali-
fied higher education expense in the same calendar year that the bonds are
redeemed. Eligibility for the interest income exemption is based on being be-
low an inflation-adjusted income threshold. In 2003, a married couple filing
a joint tax return has to have a modified adjusted gross income of $87,750 or
less to be eligible for the full interest income exemption. The exemption is
phased out so that households with income above $117,750 are no longer eligi-
ble and the range for single households is from $58,500 to $73,500. Although
the saving incentive literature focuses on tax-deferred retirement accounts,
some of the issues that affect the analysis of tax-deferred retirement accounts
also affects the analysis of the Education Savings Bond Program.3
The saving incentive literature focuses on IRAs and 401(k) plans, however
Keogh plans have been available since 1963 for self-employed persons with no
retirement security. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
created the IRA as a means of providing retirement security to the signifi-
cant portion of households not covered by a private pension plan. The 1978
Revenue Act created the 401(k) plan. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981 popularized IRAs and 401(k)’s by expanding eligibility of IRAs to virtu-
1The Treasury Department discontinued series H bonds in September 1 of 2004. How-
ever they were never eligible for the Education Savings Bond Program.
2The Bureau of the Public Debt announced that series EE bonds would earn a fixed
rate of return beginning with bonds issued in May of 2005
3The primary difference is that the Education Savings Bond Program targets a specific
asset, while all financial assets can be invested in a tax-deferred savings account. There is
also no tax deduction for buying savings bonds, unlike the tax-deductibility of contribu-
tions to a savings account. There is a penalty for misusing funds in a tax-deferred savings
account, but there is no penalty if the savings bonds are not redeemed in the same year
that there is a higher education expense. The only impact is that the bond owner would
have to pay income taxes on interest income, which he would have done in the absence of
the policy.
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ally all workers and also clarified the tax rules governing 401(k) plans. This
growth in IRAs continued until the 1986 Tax Reform Act which eliminated
the tax-deductibility of contributions for those above an income threshold,
although the tax-free accrual of interest remained. Unaffected by TRA86,
401(k) plans have become the household’s vehicle of choice for retirement
planning.
The popularity of IRAs and 401(k)’s led people to believe that tax in-
centives could encourage household savings. To help households handle the
rising higher education costs and to promote saving, both the federal and
state legislatures enacted their own education saving incentives. Congress
expanded IRA accounts to include saving for education with the creation
of the Education IRA in 1997. This was renamed the Coverdell Education
Savings Account in 2001 after Senator Paul Coverdell of Georgia, who first
proposed the legislation.4 Almost all of the states have created their own 529
savings plans, which is a state version of the Coverdell ESA.
As the original name of the Coverdell suggests, these education savings
accounts are essentially IRAs but with the focus on education expenses as
opposed to retirement. Both the retirement and education savings accounts
feature tax-free accrual of interest as well as an annual contribution limit,
income threshold and penalties for misusing account assets. Unlike IRA and
401(k) accounts, contributions to both the Coverdell ESA and the 529 plans
are not deductible at the federal level. Certain states do allow contributions
to be deductible for state income tax purposes.5
1.2.2 Theory on the Effectiveness of Saving Incentives
The different characteristics of these savings accounts have different effects
on the incentive to save. Since income taxes are deferred until withdrawal,
assets in tax-deferred retirement accounts earn a higher rate of return. The
existence of an annual contribution limit combined with empirical evidence
4Downing
5Almost all of the states offer their own 529 savings plans, which are also open to
residents of other states. Contributions can be deducted from state income taxes for some
of the states. However if contributions can be deducted, that is only available for residents
of that state and not out-of-state residents.
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that shows a significant number of households contributing up to the limit,6
raises the question of whether a marginal incentive to save exists. If house-
holds annually save the maximum amount so that the next dollar saved earns
the after-tax rate of return, then a marginal incentive to save does not exist.
However if a life-cycle model is the appropriate framework for evaluating sav-
ings behavior then lifetime contribution limits should be considered. Since
these limits do not bind, a marginal incentive to save does exist (Skinner
1991).
Another important factor is the tax-deductibility of contributions to a
retirement account. This lowers the cost of contributions. Therefore saving
in a retirement account is now more attractive and this is partly why some
believe tax incentives encourage households to reshuﬄe saving. If income
taxes are lower at retirement, then the ability to defer taxes until retirement
will also further encourage saving in a retirement account.
The last factor is the liquidity constraint created by the penalty for early
withdrawal. If households withdraw funds from an IRA or 401(k) plan before
the age of 59, then there is a 10% penalty. Education savings accounts have
a similar penalty if the funds are not used for a qualified higher education
expense. If the need for precautionary savings motivates households to save
then this liquidity issue means retirement accounts and conventional savings
accounts are imperfect substitutes. This reduces the desire to replace savings
in a conventional account with savings in a retirement account. However most
IRA contributors have considerable assets or are close to the retirement age
which limits the impact of the liquidity constraint. Since these households
are not affected by this issue they are the most likely to reshuﬄe saving.7 As
a consequence of all these features, economic theory does not provide clear
guidance on the ability of these saving incentives to increase the saving rate.
In regards to savings bonds and the Education Savings Bond Program, the
incentive effect comes from the fact that interest income is now exempt from
taxation upon withdrawal as long as there is a qualified higher education
expense. This is because the Education Savings Bond Program creates an
additional tax incentive that any series EE or I savings bond owner can take
advantage of if they have a qualified education expense. The policy does not
6Burman, Cordes and Ozanne (1990) find that 75% of contributions were made at the
limit.
7Gale and Scholz (1994)
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create any new bond that is only for education purposes. Therefore there is
no penalty if the bond is not used for education purposes. The only liquidity
issue is that all savings bonds have to be held for at least 12 months before
they can be redeemed.
1.2.3 Empirical Evidence on the Effectiveness of Saving
Incentives
In the saving incentives literature there is great difficulty in identifying the
impact of tax incentives because there is difficulty in controlling for the self-
selection problem with regards to high savers. The literature on IRAs shows
that IRA owners are wealthier and have substantially more assets, both con-
ventional and tax-advantaged.8 However this by itself does not indicate that
IRAs are new saving because it is difficult to control for propensities to save.9
If those that choose to invest in IRAs have a higher propensity to save, it
should not be a surprise that they will have more assets and therefore is not
automatic proof of a positive effect.
This difficulty in controlling for the propensity to save is seen in the re-
search of two groups of authors who use the same data to estimate the effec-
tiveness of IRA accounts but find conflicting results. Venti and Wise (1986,
1987, 1988, 1990) and Gale and Scholz (1994) use the 1983 and 1986 Survey
of Consumer Finance data sets, but the former finds that IRA contribu-
tions represent new saving while the latter finds that it represents reshuﬄed
saving.10
What is driving the different estimates is differences in interpretation of the
data and also differences in modeling. Venti and Wise examine all households
and find that very few households hold IRAs. If IRAs are good substitutes
for other saving then households should first invest in IRAs. However since
most households do not invest in IRAs it must be that they are not per-
fect substitutes and therefore IRA contributions must be from consumption
8Both proponents and critics agree that the data indicates that households with IRAs
have higher assets, where they differ is on what this means in regard to modeling and
explaining saving behavior.
9Diamond and Hausman find propensities to save to vary across households.
10Although the saving incentive literature is centered around these two, the first analysis
was actually conducted by Hubbard (1984) on IRA and Keogh accounts. He found that
contributions raised the saving rate, with the amount of the increase being correlated with
the marginal tax rate.
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(Gravelle 1991). Gale and Scholz on the other hand believe that whether
or not IRAs are perfect substitutes depends on who holds IRAs. Since IRA
contributors are older and also wealthier, they are less likely to be affected by
the liquidity constraint of IRAs and therefore more likely to find the accounts
to be good substitutes.11 As a result the Gale and Scholz model estimates
different saving equations for IRA contributors and noncontributors.
Further research has not been able to settle the debate. For instance, Feen-
berg and Skinner (1989) use the IRS-Michigan tax panel data set and find
that IRA contributors have significantly larger amounts of non-IRA assets.
Although proponents of saving incentives cite this as evidence of new saving
and this is evidence that the simple reshuﬄing story is not true, it however
does not completely rule out the possibility that there were other means of
substitution. What it does show is that IRA contributors have a higher taste
for saving when compared to noncontributors.
Attanasio and Delaire (1994) compare the behavior of new IRA contribu-
tors to old contributors as a means of controlling for unobserved heterogene-
ity in saving behavior. IRA eligibility rules were liberalized in 1982 and so
a new pool of households suddenly found themselves eligible to open IRA
accounts. If IRAs represent new saving, then new contributors should ex-
perience a larger decrease in consumption relative to existing contributors.
If IRAs represent reshuﬄed saving, new contributors will instead see a de-
cline in the amount of other saving. Attanasio and Delaire find that IRAs
represent reshuﬄed saving because new contributors experienced a decline
in other assets, but not in consumption. Proponents of IRAs though argue
that even if the initial effect is a reshuﬄing, households do not have enough
other financial assets to continue reshuﬄing and so contributions eventually
become new saving.12
Poterba, Venti and Wise (1995) compare households eligible for 401(k)’s
versus those that are not eligible for 401(k)’s and find that 401(k) savings
plans represent new saving. 401(k) plans are sponsored by firms and so
eligibility is independent of individual saving behavior. A comparison of the
two groups of households finds that total financial assets is higher for the
11A very detailed discussion on the effectiveness of IRA and 401(k)’s can be found in
Gravelle (1991), Skinner (1991), Hubbard and Skinner (1996); Poterba, Venti and Wise
(1996) and Engen, Gale and Scholz (1996).
12Poterban, Venti and Wise (1996)
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eligible group, but most importantly non-IRA/401(k) assets for the eligible
group are no lower and actually slightly higher than for the non-eligible
group. The question though is whether or not eligibility for 401(k) plans
is truly exogenous since it seems, especially for small firms, reasonable that
employers will only offer 401(k) plans if their employees request them. Engen
and Gale (2000) expand the 401(k) research by examining how the effect
varies by earnings group. They find that households with low earnings are
more likely to represent new saving.
Research on Coverdell ESA and 529 plans is limited since the plans have
only recently been created. The 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances asks if
households have an Education IRA, but does not separate the amount from
other IRA accounts. In addition, the percentages of households who use the
accounts are so low as to preclude any meaningful econometric investigations.
Dynarski (2004 a and b) examines the structure of the savings plans within
the framework of the college financial aid system and determines that high-
income households benefit the most by using the plans as a tax shelter.
Middle-class families, the intended target, are hurt because greater savings
reduces the amount of financial aid they are eligible for. Ma (2003) is able
to use data from TIAA-CREF to study the behavior of the firm’s clients and
finds that the savings plans create new savings.
1.3 Data and Methodology
1.3.1 Methodology
The identification strategy for the difference-in-difference method requires
two exogenous sources of variation. The first source of variation comes from
comparing household savings across time. For the analysis, the 1989 and
1992 Survey of Consumer Finance data sets are used.13 Since many factors
13The SCF uses a dual-frame sample design which consists of a multi-stage national
area probability sample and a list sample based on administrative data provided by the
Statistics of Income Division of the IRS (cite). The purpose of the list sample is to allow the
SCF to over-sample high-income households since the distribution of asset holdings varies
depending on the asset. Many assets such as checking and savings accounts are commonly
held so a national area probability sample provides adequate coverage. However, for
other financial assets such as stocks and bonds or property investment, the holdings are
highly skewed towards the high end of the income distribution and hence the need to
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correlated with time could drive the change in household savings during the
1989-1992 period, a control group, which is not affected by the policy, is
needed.
The Education Savings Bond Program is aimed at households with a qual-
ified higher education expense, but only if the expense is for the bondholder,
the spouse or a dependent that is claimed as an exemption on tax returns.14
The most likely target of this policy is households with children who are about
to or will be in the future going for their undergraduate degree. Therefore
the treatment group is composed of households with children under the age
of 25, since for tax purposes a dependent is either a child under the age
of 19 or under the age of 24 and a full-time student.15 Similarly a control
group composed of households without children or children over the age of
25 should not be affected by the policy. In the case of households without
children, not having a child means there is no education expense. In the
case of children over the age of 25, the child most likely has already attended
college, however even if they are still in college the parents can no longer
claim them as a dependant. This method of sorting households into treat-
ment and control groups seems to be uncorrelated with the implementation
of the policy. There is no correlation between a household having a child,
but also that child being under the age of twenty-five, and the creation of
the policy in 1990.
The regression equation that is estimated is:
savings bonds = α0 + α1 × 1992 + γ × T + β × 1992× T + η ×X (1.1)
Ideally data on both asset balances and annual savings would be used to
examine how saving behavior changes. However the SCF does not report
information on annual savings and because two independent cross-sections
are used, it is not possible to construct this variable. As a result, the analysis
measures how average balances for an asset has changed due to the policy.
1992 is a dummy variable indicating 1992 observations and T is a dummy
variable indicating the treatment group households. The 1992×T dummy
variable identifies the treatment group in 1992, therefore β is the parameter
specifically target high income households to ensure enough are included to provide an
accurate response.
14IRS Publication 970
15IRS Publication 501
9
of interest. X is a vector of individual characteristics - age, education, mar-
ital status, ethnicity, number of children, home ownership, unemployed, and
retired. From the life-cycle literature, age indicates where along the hump-
shaped income and consumption profiles a person is located. Education is
the highest level of education attained and is measured by the number of
years of schooling. Home ownership, retired and unemployed are dummy
variables while number of children is the number of children in the house-
hold. Ethnicity is a set of dummy variables indicating whether one is black,
Hispanic or Asian.
The difference-in-difference estimator, β, captures the following effect:
β = (ST,92 − SC,92)− (ST,89 − SC,89) (1.2)
Where S is asset balances, T is the treatment group of households with
children under the age of 25 and C is the control group of households without
children or children over the age of 25. β is the difference in asset balances
between the treatment and control group in 1992 net of the difference in
1989. The policy effect is the difference in saving behavior between the two
groups due to the implementation of the policy. Therefore the 1989 difference
is needed to take into consideration any pre-existing differences between the
two groups.
If a positive effect on savings bond balances is found, the next question
is did crowding out occur? It is important to analyze the impact on other
assets to ensure that a positive effect on savings bonds is not at the expense
of another asset. If asset balances of stocks or other bonds fall, then there is
no positive effect on household savings, merely a shift in preferences towards
savings bonds. The same rationale that allows one to use the difference-in-
difference method to examine the policy impact on savings bond balances can
be used to identify the policy impact on other asset balances. Since the only
difference between the treatment and control group in 1992 is the implemen-
tation of the policy, then the 1992 difference in asset balances between the
two groups, net of pre-existing differences, is also the policy effect for these
other assets. Therefore the difference-in-difference procedure is estimated on
other assets to see if crowding out occurs, where the dependent variable is
the balance for these other assets.
The focus of the SCF data set is household financial behavior and therefore
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detailed asset data is available. The SCF reports data on savings in stocks,
bonds, mutual funds and money market accounts. In addition the SCF
separates bonds into savings bonds, mortgage bonds, treasury bonds, state
and municipal bonds and corporate/foreign bonds. There are also several
mutual funds which are comprised of bonds such as tax-free bond funds,
government bond funds and other bond funds. The difference-in-difference
analysis is applied to both the overall household asset portfolio as well as
this more detailed bond portfolio. There is an emphasis on bond holdings
since these assets are most similar to savings bonds and therefore the most
likely source of any asset substitution if crowding out occurs.16
The different assets are separated into five categories which are based on
Poterba and Samwick’s (2002) analysis of the effects of taxation on asset
portfolio composition. The benefit of this decomposition is that it arranges
assets by tax treatment. Poterba and Samwick separate stocks into taxable
equity (directly-held) and taxable equity (mutual funds) due to differences
in tax treatment, although this should be unnecessary for the purposes of
the Education Savings Bond Program. In the case of bonds it does seem
prudent to separate taxable and tax-exempt bonds since government sav-
ings bonds are more similar to the latter. Interest-bearing accounts includes
checking accounts, savings accounts, money market accounts and certificates
of deposit.17
1.3.2 Data Set
The combined sample consists of 4,299 observations.18 In addition to being
below an income threshold, households have to file a joint tax return, if mar-
ried, or file as a single household. Observations that do not meet the proper
16Both savings bonds and treasury bonds are exempt from state and local taxation while
state and municipal bonds are exempt from federal income taxation. These bonds are also
seen as being less risky because they are issued by the government.
17The full analysis included regressing on all of the asset variables that comprise the first
five categories in addition to a more extensive combination of aggregate asset measures,
but yielded the same results. In the full analysis housing value, debt and long-term savings
– such as retirement plances and life insurance – are also included. However this more
extensive analysis does not change the analysis or interpretation of the results.
181,874 of these observations are in the treatment group while 2,425 are in the control
group. 1,938 are from the 1989 sample and 2,361 are from the 1992 sample. 858 are in the
1989 treatment group; 1,080 are in the 1989 control group; 1,016 are in the 1992 treatment
group; 1,345 are in the 1992 control group
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Table 1.1: Asset Variable Descriptions
Asset Variable Description
Taxable Equity (directly-held) All holdings of stocks outside of mutual
funds and tax-deferred retirement accounts.
Taxable Equity (mutual funds) All holdings of stocks within mutual funds.
Taxable Bonds Federal government bonds, corporate bonds
and foreign bonds directly held or held within
mutual funds, but not in tax-deferred
retirement accounts.
Tax-Exempt Bonds State and municipal bonds directly held or in
mutual funds, but not in tax-deferred
retirement accounts.
Interest-Bearing Accounts Checking, savings, money market and CD’s.
Short-Term Financial Assets Equity (directly-held), equity (mutual funds),
taxable bonds, tax-exempt bonds,
interest-bearing accounts.
Bond Portfolio Savings bonds, treasury bonds, state and
municipal bonds, mortgage bonds, tax-free
bond funds, government bond funds and
other bond funds.
filing status or are above the income threshold are not included in the sample.
Table 1.2 lists demographic information for the 1989 population, separated
by treatment and control group.19 The treatment and control group are sim-
ilar in education levels. The treatment group is also younger, more likely to
be married and earns slightly more money. The average household in the
treatment group has two children, while the control group has almost zero.
The average household in the treatment group is also more likely to own their
home. The treatment group is only slightly less likely to be unemployed, but
significantly less likely to be retired.
Table 1.3 lists household asset balances for the 1989 population. Columns
I and II are for the original sample and columns III and IV are for when
households older than 65 are dropped. From columns I and II a distinct
19In the SCF, information about the household is focused on a primary economic unit
(PEU) - which is considered to be the economically dominant single individual or couple
and those who are financially dependent on them. Individuals who are in the household
but are financially independent of this core individual/couple are not considered to be a
part of the PEU. The head of the household is either the single individual, the male in a
mixed-sex household or the older individual in the case of a same-sex couple. Demographic
characteristics in this paper refer to the head of the household only.
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Table 1.2: Demographic Characteristics
Demographic Original Sample Drop 65+
Characteristics Col. I Col. II Col. III Col. IV
1989 Population Treatment Control Treatment Control
Age 39.26 53.72 39.18 44.52
Education 12.97 12.77 12.97 13.30
Married (%) 79.91 46.84 79.85 42.81
AGI ($) 27,255.62 22,151.63 27,254.13 23,759.67
Retired (%) 1.80 27.37 1.60 8.52
Unemployed (%) 7.51 10.62 7.53 8.47
# of Children 2.03 0.10 2.03 0.10
Own Home (%) 67.44 59.50 67.38 52.39
Data is from 1989 Survey of Consumer Finance.
pattern emerges where the treatment group consistently has lower balances
than the control group. The exception is government bond fund balances.
Asset balances for government bond funds average $344.16 for the treatment
group compared to $248.94 for the control group.20 For the asset of interest,
savings bonds, the treatment group has one-third the value – $476.61 for the
treatment group versus $1,561.70 for the control group. For short-term fi-
nancial assets the difference is substantial, the treatment group has balances
of $12,489.84 while the control group has balances of $42,337.19. Although
the treatment and control group do not have to be perfectly identical for
the difference-in-difference methodology to be valid, the systematic and siz-
able differences in asset balances does raise concerns about the validity of
comparing the two groups.
1.3.3 Understanding the Difference Between Treatment and
Control
The difference between the treatment and control group is that the control
group consists of older households, because their children are older, and
households with no children. The question now is whether this implies that
the desire to save for the control group differs from the treatment group.
The two major motivations for saving are the life-cycle hypothesis and the
bequest motive hypothesis. If the former dominates, then older households
20All dollar values are in 1989 dollars.
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Table 1.3: Asset Balances
Asset Variable Original Sample Drop 65+
1989 Population Col. I Col. II Col. III Col. IV
$ Treatment Control Treatment Control
Savings Bonds 479.61 1,561.70 480.49 697.48
Taxable Equity 2,174.34 10,399.98 2,180.50 4,129.15
Taxable Equity (Mutual Funds) 539.85 1,693.79 529.89 815.41
Taxable Bonds 614.25 3,300.66 614.78 1,144.40
Tax-Exempt Bonds 702.22 5,746.37 703.72 1,872.73
Interest-Bearing Accounts 7,999.26 20,850.39 7,979.84 9,913.50
Short-Term Financial Assets 12,489.84 42,337.19 12,469.45 18,443.79
Bond Portfolio 1,156.24 6,737.78 1,157.19 1,997.05
Tax-Free Bond Fund 82.52 1,334.40 82.77 517.08
State and Municipal Bonds 468.03 3,434.54 468.82 910.93
Government Bond Funds 344.16 248.94 345.21 112.55
Other Bonds Funds 26.07 220.29 26.15 214.50
Mortgage Bonds 27.38 326.58 27.40 95.60
Treasury Bonds 181.22 1,414.97 180.49 293.04
will have higher savings because they are further along the life-cycle, but not
because they have a different desire to save. If the latter dominates then the
saving behavior of the control group will differ because households with no
children will not have any motive to save.
Table 1.4 reports the age distribution by treatment and control group for
the 1989 population. From columns I and II, the treatment group is sub-
stantially younger with 92.59% between the ages of 25 and 54 while 53.06%
of the control group is older than 55 and 33.53% is older than 65. Table
1.5 lists asset balances by age interval. The differences in asset balances be-
tween the treatment and control group are much smaller for most of the age
intervals. For instance, asset balances for savings bonds are very comparable
for the 35-44 age range, the treatment group has balances of $621.95 versus
$803.45 for the control group, and the 45-54 age range, the treatment group
has balances of $473.93 versus $416.52 for the control group. For short-term
financial assets, the difference in savings is less than $2,000 for the 25-34,
35-44 and 45-54 age ranges.
In addition the pattern of the treatment group always holding less, which
is evident in Table 1.3, disappears once age is accounted for. In Table 1.5,
for taxable equity, the treatment group holds less for the 35-44 and 55-64
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Table 1.4: Age Distribution
Age Intervals Original Drop 65+
Cumulative Distribution Col. I Col. II Col. III Col. IV
1989 Population Treatment Control Treatment Control
25 – 34 33.95 18.32 34.25 27.56
35 – 44 71.90 32.22 72.53 48.47
45 – 54 92.59 46.40 93.39 69.81
55 – 64 99.14 66.47 100.00 100.00
65+ 100.00 100.00 – –
Table 1.5: Asset Balances By Age Intervals
Asset Variable 25 - 34 35 - 44 45 - 54
1989 Population Col. I Col. II Col. III Col. IV Col. V Col. VI
$ Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control
Savings Bonds 327.93 193.32 621.95 803.45 473.93 416.52
Taxable Equity 1,186.67 801.46 1,534.06 2,015.15 4,254.10 3,476.00
Taxable Equity (MF) 17.33 43.93 534.32 297.33 1,199.99 715.77
Taxable Bonds 23.99 0.78 530.61 627.56 452.92 908.04
Tax-Exempt Bonds 228.74 105.93 1,059.55 1,459.37 942.57 739.27
Interest-Bearing Accts 4,387.22 4,552.78 7,577.58 6,157.53 10,848.67 10,362.19
Short-Term Fin Assets 6,168.15 5,694.53 11,830.54 11,359.86 18,149.37 16,603.26
Bond Portfolio 352.46 254.15 1,860.85 1,329.36 1,442.19 949.64
Tax-Free Bond Fund 58.78 16.46 58.44 715.46 85.38 231.06
State and Muni Bonds 0.78 60.83 786.33 409.13 842.46 279.26
Govt Bond Funds 0.00 0.00 6.19 395.02 201.85 108.05
Other Bond Funds 0.00 0.00 34.95 0.00 51.49 533.46
Mortgage Bonds 0.00 0.00 53.57 0.00 29.56 28.76
Treasury Bonds 23.75 0.00 399.00 116.77 96.24 225.10
55 - 64 65+
Treatment Control Treatment Control
Savings Bonds 547.15 1,328.49 191.87 3,391.11
Taxable Equity 4,919.67 9,330.21 157.40 23,641.68
Taxable Equity (MF) 1,306.24 1,996.25 3,806.70 3,551.82
Taxable Bonds 4,413.27 2,797.25 440.73 7,864.94
Tax-Exempt Bonds 644.55 4,720.06 209.87 13,918.00
Interest-Bearing Accts 20,441.43 17,431.38 14,358.93 43,997.72
Short-Term Fin Assets 32,219.99 37,180.06 19,165.50 92,882.84
Bond Portfolio 867.31 4,928.62 842.47 16,766.21
Tax-Free Bond Fund 319.01 1,085.53 0.00 3,044.70
State and Muni Bonds 208.85 2,548.45 209.87 8,767.74
Govt Bond Funds 4,154.78 37.59 0.00 538.44
Other Bond Funds 43.31 345.92 0.00 231.64
Mortgage Bonds 26.19 302.42 20.99 816.49
Treasury Bonds 85.12 749.26 419.75 3,790.87
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age ranges, but holds more for the 25-34 and 45-54 age ranges. For interest-
bearing accounts, the treatment group holds more for all age intervals except
for the 25-34 and 65+ age ranges.
The age interval where the discrepancy in savings is greatest is the 65+ age
interval. Savings bond balances for this age interval is $191.87 for the treat-
ment group and $3,391.11 for the control group. Taxable equity balances for
the 65+ age interval are $157.40 for the treatment group and $23,641.68 for
the control group. The systematic and significant differences in the treatment
and control group that were found earlier are being driven by the fact that
65+ households are such a large part of the control group. Because these
households are retired, it is not surprising that their savings differs from the
general population. A new sample is created which drops 65+ households.
Columns III and IV in Table 1.3 report asset balances for the 1989 treat-
ment and control group but now with the 65+ households dropped. Average
balances for the treatment group are much more comparable to average bal-
ances of the control group. In 1989, the treatment group has savings bond
balances of $480.49, while the control group has balances of $697.48. Bal-
ances for taxable equity, tax-exempt bonds and short-term financial assets
are all more similar when the 65+ households are dropped from the sam-
ple. The average asset balance for the control group falls from $10,399.98 to
$4,129.15 for taxable equity and from $5,746.37 to $1,872.73 for tax-exempt
bonds. Short-term financial asset balances for the control group fall from
$42,337.19 to $18,443.79, which is significantly closer to the average balance
of $12,469.45 for the treatment group.
Regression analysis is used to test the significance of the difference in
average asset balances between the treatment and control group. The asset
balance is regressed on a dummy variable indicating the treatment group. A
separate version includes controls for age.
asset balance = α0 + γ × T + η1 × Age+ η2 × Age2 (1.3)
The results in Table 1.6 confirm the story found by examining asset balances
by age intervals. Column I is the results regressed on the original sample
but with no age controls. The estimates are negative because the treatment
group has lower average balances. The estimates are significant because the
treatment group has much lower average balances. When age controls are
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added, column II, the estimates are now smaller and no longer significant.
For savings bonds, controlling for age reduces the estimated difference from
–$1,082.08 to –$170.53, while for tax-exempt bonds controlling for age re-
duces the estimated difference from –$5,044.15 to –$296.12. Also not all the
estimates are negative because now in certain cases, such as taxable equity
(mutual funds) or taxable bonds, the treatment group has larger average
balances.
Columns III and IV repeat the previous analysis but for the new sample
which excludes 65+ households. Comparing column I to column III reveals
the impact of dropping 65+ households. In column III, where there are no age
controls and the 65+ households are dropped, the estimates are much smaller
and no longer significant in almost all of the cases. The estimated difference
for savings bonds falls from –$1,082.08 to –$216.99. For taxable bonds, the
estimated difference falls from –$2,686.40 to –$529.62. This improvement in
the comparability of average asset balances is because the age profiles of the
two groups is now much more similar as seen in columns III and IV of Table
1.4, although it should be noted the treatment group is still significantly
younger.
The second issue is whether or not the subset of households without chil-
dren are fundamentally different than households with children. If savings
is motivated by a bequest motive then households without children have no
motive to save. The question is who are these childless households. Table 1.7
is the age profile, by treatment and control group, where the control group
now consists only of households with children over the age of 25. The con-
trol group is now much older. Only 7.74% are between the ages of 25-34,
previously it was 27.56%, and only 21.7% are between the ages of 25-44,
previously it was 48.47%. Therefore the childless households are not neces-
sarily households who have decided to not have children. Instead they are
younger households who have yet to have a child. Although they currently
do not have a child, it cannot be said with certainty that they will never
have children and thus it is not clear that these childless households have
fundamentally different saving behavior.
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Table 1.6: Regression To Test Difference In Asset Balances Between
Treatment And Control Group
Estimates for γ Original Control Drop 65+
1989 Population Col. I Col. II Col. III Col. IV
$ No Controls Age Controls No Controls Age Controls
Savings Bonds –1,082.08‡ –170.53 –216.99 –57.73
(369.91) (196.60) (187.31) (170.14)
Taxable Equity –8,225.64† –1,376.93 –1,948.65† –12.65
(3,344.78) (1,448.30) (896.23) (840.90)
Taxable Equity (Mutual Funds) –1,153.94† 5.60 –285.52 101.29
(499.73) (359.40) (306.18) 322.75
Taxable Bonds –2,686.40‡ 58.37 –529.62 567.22
(988.21) (700.27) (559.46) (805.09)
Tax-Exempt Bonds –5,044.15‡ –296.12 –1,169.01 –457.68
(1,772.70) (934.86) (615.24) (653.26)
Interest-Bearing Accounts –12,851.13‡ 1,868.45 –1,933.66 1,430.53
(2,499.92) (1,707.96) (1,330.78) (1,823.77)
Short-Term Financial Assets –29,847.35‡ 574.85 –5,974.34‡ 1,576.57
(5,484.29) (2,931.76) (2,200.52) (2,605.20)
Bond Portfolio –5,581.54‡ –373.07 –839.86 –88.84
(1,699.65) (782.99) (472.34) (376.58)
Tax-Free Bond Fund –1,251.88 –274.83 –434.31 –244.49
(972.28) (484.16) (437.88) (562.20)
State and Municipal Bonds –2,966.50† 41.73 –442.11 –74.52
(1,304.06) (695.21) (375.63) (275.85)
Government Bond Funds 95.22 542.71 232.66 656.76
(345.20) (592.07) (347.29) (815.01)
Other Bond Funds –194.21 –100.01 –188.35 –110.54
(148.96) (138.65) (195.77) (114.55)
Mortgage Bonds –299.20 –65.99 –68.20 6.02
(204.87) (59.47) (50.96) (22.12)
Treasury Bonds –1,233.75 –178.27 –112.55 37.38
(477.74) (219.32) (181.91) (119.48)
† significant at 5% level; ‡ significant at 1% level
Table 1.7: Age Distribution
Cumulative Distribution Col. III Col. IV
1989 Population Treatment Control
25 – 34 34.25 7.74
35 – 44 72.53 21.70
45 – 54 93.39 51.71
55 – 64 100.00 100.00
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1.4 Results
1.4.1 Savings Bonds
The regression equation is estimated with four different combinations of de-
mographic variables. First no additional demographic variables are included.
The second and third include controls for age – first by adding a quadratic
age term and second by using dummy variables to reflect age intervals. Lastly
the regression equation is estimated with the full set of demographic vari-
ables – age, age2, education, ethnicity, marital status, number of children
and dummy variables for being retired or owning a home.
The results from Table 1.8 indicate that the policy had no significant effect
on the difference in asset balances between the treatment and control group.
β is $222.17 when no controls are included, although adding control variables
does not change the results with β = $220.50 when the full set of demographic
variables is included. Table 1.9 lists asset balances by year and by treatment
group. The estimate of $222.17 for β can be decomposed as follows:
β = (ST,92 − SC,92)− (ST,89 − SC,89)
= ($598.35− 593.18)− (480.49− 697.48)
= 5.17− (−216.99) = 222.17
Although β is found to be insignificant the data indicates that there po-
tentially could have been a response. Savings bond balances increased from
$480.49 to $598.38 for the treatment group while they decreated from $697.48
to $593.18 for the control group. Therefore the estimate of $222.17 is based
on an increase of $117.86 from the treatment group and a decrease of $104.30
by the control group. However as the standard errors indicate there is sig-
nificant variation so although on average there is this pattern, it does not
necessarily hold for individual households.
1.4.2 Crowding Out
Table 1.10 reports the estimates for β only for the remaining asset variables.
Similar to savings bonds, the estimates are insignificant. This includes the
household bond portfolio and the individual bonds which would be the most
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likely source of substitution. From Table 1.9, the overall bond portfolio in-
creases from $1,157.19 to $1,259.33 for the treatment group but only increases
from $1,997.05 to $2,017.17 for the control group. However this implies that
the increase for the treatment group is only $82.02 larger than than the
control group.
The asset balance data does seem to suggest that some substitution has
occurred. For instance government bond fund balances fell for the treat-
ment group, $345.21 to $153.16, while rose for the control group, $112.55
to $388.29. In addition state and municipal balances fell for the treatment
group, $468.82 to $423.89, while they rose for the control group, $910.93 to
$1,156.18. Any savings bonds in a government bond fund would not be eligi-
ble for the policy because they are not directly held by the household, while
state and municipal bonds offer similar levels of riskiness as government sav-
ings bonds. However without a significant estimate or a more clear pattern
in household bond holdings, it is difficult to make any definitive conclusions
about crowding out.
1.4.3 Alternative Explanations
IRA plans generated a sizable response in the mid-eighties. However some
argue that the popularity behind IRA plans was not necessarily due to the
tax incentives but rather due to the heavy promotion from the financial ser-
vices industry. Meanwhile the Education Savings Bond program targets an
asset that is not a substantial part of the household asset portfolio. The
average American household holds less than $1,000 in savings bonds. It is
possible that the policy was not as heavily promoted and thus households
were not aware of the benefit. It is possible that only savings bond owners or
financially savvy investors responded. As a result the following analysis fo-
cuses on either the population of savings bond owners only or some measure
of financial savvy – owning an IRA, education level or being wealthy. The
rationale for these three different measures is that they indicate households
with a taste for saving. The IRA literature clearly shows that IRA partici-
pants have a high taste for saving. In addition the empirical data suggests
that savings increases with both education and wealth. The new regression
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equation is:
savings bonds = α0 + α1 × 1992 + γ × T + β1 × 1992× T (1.4)
+α2 × savvy + φ1 × 1992× savvy + φ2 × T × savvy+
β2 × 1992× T × savvy + η ×X
where savvy is the dummy variable for financial sophistication, or the set of
dummy variables in the case of education and income. The 1992 × savvy
coefficient captures any difference in financial sophistication across years for
the control group. The T × savvy coefficient captures any pre-existing dif-
ference in financial sophistication between the treatment and control group.
The new parameter of interest is 1992× T × savvy and captures any policy
effect on the financially sophisticated in the treatment group in 1992. This
new parameter measures how the effect on the treatment group in 1992 varies
between IRA owners and non-IRA owners or across education or income lev-
els.
Table 1.11 reports the difference-in-difference estimates for β when the
sample is restricted to savings bond owners only. The estimates are insignif-
icant which implies that bond holders did not respond despite them being
the households most likely to be aware of the program. Table 1.12 reports
results for IRA owners and the variable of interest is 1992× T × IRA. The
estimate is insignificant. The savings bond balances of IRA owners in the
treatment group in 1992 does not differ from the savings bond balances for
non-IRA owners in the treatment group, after having controlled for being
an IRA owner, being an IRA owner in 1992 and being an IRA owner in the
treatment group. Table 1.13 reports results by education interval and the
parameters of interest are 1992 × T × Education Level. Again the results
are insignificant. Table 1.14 reports results by income quintiles and the pa-
rameters of interest are 1992 × T × Income Quintile. Again the results are
insignificant.
The design of the policy may indicate why there is a lack of interest.
Savings bonds are not a substantial portion of the household asset portfolio.
In addition the tax incentive is not very significant. Savings bonds already
feature tax-free accrual of interest income. The incentive is the ability to
exclude this income from taxation. However since households do not hold
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significant amounts of savings bonds, the tax benefit is small and therefore
may not be valuable enough to alter a household’s preferences for savings
bonds. Consider a hypothetical household which has $1,000 saved in savings
bonds, which earn a 5% rate of return and the household faces a marginal
tax rate of 35%. The interest income is $50 and so the Education Savings
Bond Program generates a tax savings of $17.50 for the household.
1.5 Conclusion
The Education Savings Bond Program was analyzed to see if tax incentives
could encourage households to save. The difficulty in identifying the effect
of tax incentives is being able to separate the policy effect from the effect of
being a high saver. This problem is prevalent in both the IRA and 401(k)
literature. The benefit of the Education Savings Bond Program is that the
beneficiaries of the policy – households with a higher education expense –
should not be correlated with being a high saver. The regression results indi-
cate no significant policy response. This includes exploring asset balances for
other assets in an effort to see if crowding out occurs. Focusing the analysis
on households who are most likely to be financially literate and who have
a taste for saving does not yield a policy effect either. One possibility that
could explain the lack of a policy response is the design of the tax incentive.
The Education Savings Bond Program did not create a new class of savings
bonds, but rather added an additional tax incentive to existing savings bonds.
However the tax incentive is being able to exempt interest income from tax-
ation and since the average household does not hold significant amounts of
savings bonds, the value of this incentive is modest.
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Table 1.8: Savings Bonds Regression Results
Drop 65+ Col. I Col. II Col. III Col. IV
$ 1989 Dollars No Controls Age Controls Age Dummies Full Controls
1992 –104.30 –119.40 –118.59 –132.39
(198.78) (197.95) (198.89) (190.31)
Treatment –216.99 –116.61 –136.67 –135.34
(187.28) (166.85) (173.94) (247.24)
1992× Treatment 222.17 225.58 224.64 220.50
(241.63) (241.92) (242.14) (234.57)
Age – 34.80 – 0.38
(54.90) (41.47)
Age Squared – –0.16 – 0.18
0.68) (0.51)
35 – 44 – – 363.59† –
(142.97)
45 – 54 – – 270.22 –
(131.49)
55 – 64 – – 614.51‡ –
(229.19)
Education – – – 59.97‡
(19.10)
Married – – – 185.19
(133.05)
Number of Children – – – –49.39
(101.39)
Retired – – – –184.08
(641.91)
Unemployed – – – –155.42
(138.61)
Home – – – 397.21‡
(106.39)
Asian – – – –35.20
(220.73)
Black – – – 18.62
(245.15)
Hispanic – – – –217.69†
(99.44)
† significant at 5% level; ‡ significant at 1% level
Standard errors are in parentheses
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Table 1.9: Asset Balances Across Years
Asset Variable Treatment Group Control Group
$ 1989 Dollars Col. I Col. II Col. III Col. IV
1989 1992 1989 1992
Savings Bonds 480.49 598.35 697.48 593.18
Taxable Equity 2,180.50 4,182.66 4,129.15 4,358.54
Taxable Equity (Mutual Funds) 529.89 1,228.33 815.41 1,996.96
Taxable Bonds 614.78 749.22 1,144.40 1,086.88
Tax-Exempt Bonds 703.72 1,036.75 1,872.73 2,076.88
Interest-Bearing Accounts 7,979.84 6,170.34 9,913.50 9,584.33
Short-Term Financial Assets 12,469.45 13,477.81 18,443.79 19,411.21
Bond Portfolio 1,157.19 1,259.33 1,997.05 2,017.17
Tax-Free Bond Fund 82.77 294.12 517.08 497.62
State and Municipal Bonds 468.82 423.89 910.93 1,156.18
Government Bond Funds 345.21 153.16 112.55 388.29
Other Bond Funds 26.15 70.84 214.50 193.29
Mortgage Bonds 27.40 18.40 95.60 25.18
Treasury Bonds 180.49 218.69 293.04 242.63
Table 1.10: Regression Results For Other Assets
Estimates for β Col. I Col. II Col. III Col. IV
$ 1989 Dollars No Controls Age Controls Age Dummies Full Controls
Taxable Equity 1,772.77 1,884.11 1,828.77 1,889.03
(2,040.57) (2,033.42) (2,058.46) (2,032.80)
Taxable Equity (MF) –483.11 –448.46 –452.30 –474.84
(591.02) (584.17) (589.40) (585.72)
Taxable Bonds 191.95 241.14 214.15 151.16
(645.74) (640.99) (641.32) (626.11)
Tax-Exempt Bonds 128.88 179.70 178.67 78.06
(992.41) (975.83) (978.73) (1,017.67)
Interest-Bearing Accounts –1,480.34 –1,339.99 –1,426.32 –1,539.36
(1,639.32) (1,615.34) (1,624.98) (1,631.23)
Short-Term Financial Assets 40.94 422.38 246.97 –12.13
(3,448.16) (3,367.25) (3,407.17) (3,373.09)
Bond Portfolio 82.02 131.46 119.96 16.26
(953.50) (932.36) (930.52) (967.49)
Tax-Free Bond Fund 230.81 240.35 244.37 238.05
(561.91) (553.20) (557.88) (559.54)
State & Municipal Bonds –290.18 –255.25 –260.92 –346.35
(840.58) (824.10) (822.96) (870.98)
Government Bond Funds –467.79 –450.82 –458.13 –479.25
(386.28) (375.44) (380.15) (399.56)
Other Bond Funds 65.90 73.35 69.61 55.49
(210.70) (215.08) (213.08) (200.25)
Mortgage Bonds 61.42 64.42 63.31 61.32
(63.32) (63.33) (63.21) (61.65)
Treasury Bonds 88.61 96.72 92.94 80.79
(239.27) (238.60) (235.72) (235.96)
† significant at 5% level; ‡ significant at 1% level
Standard errors are in parentheses
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Table 1.11: Regression Results For Savings Bond Owners Only
Estimates for β Col. I Col. II Col. III Col. IV
$ 1989 Dollars No Controls Age Controls Age Dummies Full Controls
Savings Bonds 1,176.93 1,373.68 1,293.37 1,364.23
(1,081.85) (1,066.20) (1,048.24) (1,078.78)
Taxable Equity 3,239.22 4,025.54 4,218.65 4,037.66
(3,491.07) (3,623.26) (3,580.81) (3,686.74)
Taxable Equity (MF) –1,662.51 –1,401.66 –1,552.61 –1,407.83
(1,725.80) (1,697.50) (1,739.81) (1,726.87)
Taxable Bonds 256.69 466.14 469.30 289.98
(1,436.08) (1,461.88) (1,506.27) (1,522.07)
Tax-Exempt Bonds 1,586.12 1,897.78 1,750.76 1,956.55
(2,266.66) (2,221.12) (2,276.73) (2,255.28)
Interest-Bearing Accounts –1,404.96 –324.50 –310.79 –125.19
(3,877.16) (3,720.82) (3,752.46) (4,053.40)
Short-Term Financial Assets 2,191.30 4,961.62 4,869.53 4,992.64
(8,127.89) (7,964.12) (8,091.43) (8,157.00)
Bond Portfolio 2,610.21 2,663.18 2,487.42 2,502.06
(2,254.39) (2,200.67) (2,240.72) (2,239.58)
Tax-Free Bond Fund –630.54 –563.66 –614.27 –566.66
(1,126.16) (1,092.11) (1,123.80) (1,116.09)
State & Municipal Bonds 1,081.33 1,292.14 1,222.17 1,326.36
(1,658.78) (1,638.43) (1,670.97) (1,649.52)
Government Bond Funds –220.25 –196.62 –205.01 –181.46
(357.94) (350.05) (353.08) (361.25)
Other Bond Funds 90.64 139.98 104.24 119.86
(979.81) (1,021.43) (996.87) (1,081.27)
Mortgage Bonds 144.08 154.88 147.07 162.81
(130.31) (134.98) (132.89) (142.07)
Treasury Bonds –242.13 –157.53 –175.19 –351.34
(762.03) (758.96) (797.21) (813.45)
† significant at 5% level; ‡ significant at 1% level
Standard errors are in parentheses
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Table 1.12: Financial Savvy Measure: IRA Owners
Savings Bond Estimates Col. I Col. II Col. III
IRA Owners No Controls Age Controls Full Controls
1992 –168.00 79.57 –187.29
(160.53) (528.78) (160.64)
Treatment –32.33 10.51 –1.42
(168.88) (187.47) (227.98)
1992× Treatment 223.81 226.70 219.14
(204.91) (203.75) (203.53)
IRA 967.14† 866.96 679.80
(481.63) (451.25) (460.61)
1992× IRA 71.35 79.57 102.96
(529.01) (528.78) (537.95)
Treatment× IRA –531.54 –478.54 –469.33
(594.76) (572.06) (569.22)
1992× Treatment× IRA 196.44 177.54 160.75
(791.91) (791.35) (799.49)
Age Controls No Yes Yes
Demographic Controls No No Yes
† significant at 5% level; ‡ significant at 1% level
Standard errors are in parentheses
Table 1.13: Financial Savvy Measure: Education
Savings Bond Estimates Col. I Col. II Col. III
Education Intervals No Controls Age Controls Full Controls
1992 –406.61 –422.00 –421.36
(432.48) (434.20) (427.86)
Treatment –426.35 –273.99 –289.90
(454.00) (410.58) (481.53)
1992× Treatment 390.64 406.64 390.21
(489.63) (496.89) (490.33)
1992× Treatment×No High School –660.85 –684.57 –635.27
(619.79) (628.30) (642.93)
1992× Treatment× Some College –887.00 –861.39 –808.20
(617.47) (620.51) (620.17)
1992× Treatment× College Degree 136.79 138.09 149.94
(955.39) (962.31) (955.80)
1992× Treatment×Graduate Degree 776.48 772.69 817.48
(891.62) (887.97) (905.47)
Education Dummies Yes Yes Yes
1992× Education Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Treatment× Education Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Age Controls No Yes Yes
Demographic Controls No No Yes
† significant at 5% level; ‡ significant at 1% level
Standard errors are in parentheses
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Table 1.14: Income Intervals Regression Results
Savings Bond Estimates Col. I Col. II Col. III
Income Intervals No Controls Age Controls Full Controls
1992 –377.82 –392.43 –272.50
(226.23) (229.73) (205.44)
Treatment –379.87 –258.29 –139.49
(256.60) (253.94) (344.94)
1992× Treatment 449.27 462.09 412.21
(367.39) (366.57) (370.42)
1992× Treatment×Quintile 1 –217.52 –269.76 –211.83
(379.99) (376.63) (382.32)
1992× Treatment×Quintile 2 –798.67 –781.06 –670.04
(517.12) (515.52) (525.08)
1992× Treatment×Quintile 3 –720.23 –688.02 –502.14
(640.38) (641.59) (658.09)
1992× Treatment×Quintile 4 –61.06 3.43 278.09
(1,370.27) (1,362.39) (1,413.63)
Quintile Dummies Yes Yes Yes
1992× Income Quintile Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Treatment× Income Quintile Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Age Controls No Yes Yes
Demographic Controls No No Yes
† significant at 5% level; ‡ significant at 1% level
Standard errors are in parentheses
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CHAPTER 2
NON-LINEAR ENGEL CURVES AND THE
INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL
TAXES
2.1 Introduction
Growing concern about the environmental costs of household energy con-
sumption has led to increased debate about the appropriate level of environ-
mental taxes. Environmental taxes, such as the gasoline tax, are regressive
and if one is also concerned about equity then the optimal environmental
tax rate should be calculated within an optimal income tax framework. A
complete optimal tax model includes the cross-price elasticity for leisure,
yet many previous analyses assume either separability in leisure or that la-
bor supply is constant (Cremer, Gahvari and Ladoux 1998, 2003). West
and Williams (2004, 2007) address this when they estimate a household de-
mand model in order to calculate the optimal gasoline tax. They use the Al-
most Ideal Demand System (AIDS) model of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a)
which does not assume separability between consumption goods and leisure.
This paper also uses the AIDS model to estimate household demand and then
calculates cross-price elasticities, including the cross-price elasticity of leisure
with respect to the energy good price. The AIDS model does assume linear
Engel curves which could potentially bias welfare estimates if income effects
are non-linear. This leads Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1997) to extend the
AIDS model by assuming non-linear Engel curves. They name their extension
the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS). The objective is to
estimate household demand for energy using the AIDS and QUAIDS models,
and to compare the corresponding environmental tax incidence calculations
for a tax on total household energy consumption.
Household consumption consists of a composite clean good, a composite
energy good and leisure. If the household is married then male and female
leisure consumption is estimated separately. The composite energy good
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consists of gasoline consumption and home energy consumption – electricity,
natural gas or home heating fuels and oils. The composite clean good is
the difference between total household consumption and the composite en-
ergy good. Leisure consumption is calculated using a time endowment of
14 hours per day. Consumption data is from the 1996-1999 Consumer Ex-
penditure Survey while the price for the clean and energy goods comes from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Households are separated into married and
single households. Married households are further separated into households
with only one working spouse and households with two working spouses. The
AIDS and QUAIDS models are estimated on each sample separately. Cross-
price elasticity estimates and welfare loss estimates are calculated using the
estimated parameters.
The rationale for the QUAIDS model is that the relationship between bud-
get shares and income is not always linear for every good. However it is not
necessarily non-linear for every good either. Banks, Blundell and Lewbel
develop their QUAIDS model to be flexible enough so that the non-linear
Engel curve specification does not have to be applied to each good. The
QUAIDS model is first applied to all goods, however the non-linear Engel
curve specification is only applicable to the energy good and leisure and then
only for the single household sample. Therefore a mixed-QUAIDS model is
estimated on single households only, where the clean good is estimated ac-
cording to the AIDS specification and the energy good and leisure according
to the QUAIDS specification. The compensated cross-price elasticity of la-
bor supply with respect to the energy good price is –0.0159 and significant
for the single household AIDS model, and 0.0514 but insignificant for the
single household QUAIDS model. Moreover the AIDS model overestimates
welfare loss for low-income single households and underestimates welfare loss
for high-income single households. The AIDS model is the appropriate model
for both married household samples.
2.2 Data Set and Sample
The Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) consists of two separate and in-
dependent components – an Interview Survey, which tracks household con-
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sumption over four consecutive quarters,1 and a Diary Survey, which tracks
daily consumption over a two-week period. The Interview Survey focuses on
large expenditures, such as durable goods, or expenditures, such as rent or
utilities, that occur on a regular basis. The Interview Survey also includes
average three-month estimates of expenditures on smaller items such as food
and alcohol. Therefore the survey covers approximately 95% of a household’s
expenditures.2 The 1996-1999 Interview Surveys are used for this analysis.
Four quarters of data are available for each year. Although it is possible for
an individual household to appear in up to four consecutive quarters, this
is too short a time period to be able to create a panel data set. Annual
consumption cannot be calculated since four quarters of data is not available
for every household. A pooled cross-sectional data set is created by treating
each of the sixteen quarters as an independent sample.
The CES sampling methodology is designed to cover the consumption be-
havior of the U.S. civilian non-institutional population. Households over the
age of 65 or under the age of 18 are dropped. Married households are dropped
if either spouse is over 65 or under 18. Households over the age of 65 are
assumed to be retired and their labor-leisure choice differs from households
where either spouse is still working. Similarly, households under the age of
18 are dropped because they are assumed to still be in high school. If neither
spouse in the household works, the household is dropped regardless of the
reason for unemployment. The following occupation codes are also dropped –
armed forces, self-employed and farming, forestry and fishing. Self-employed
households are dropped because of their ability to dictate, to some degree,
their income and hours worked. The other two occupation codes are dropped
because the nature of their work implies a different labor-leisure choice than
other occupations.3 This yields a sample of 43,516 households.
The CES reports aggregate household expenditures as well as detailed ex-
1Households are interviewed for five quarters. The first quarter collects demographic
and baseline consumption information. Consumption data is only collected for the latter
four quarters.
2http://www.bls.gov/opub/hom/pdf/homch16.pdf
3This paper is a companion to another paper that calculates optimal income and envi-
ronmental tax rates within a Mirrlees framework. Occupation codes are used to proxy for
skill types and since households who do not work cannot report occupation codes, they
are dropped. In addition, to keep the numerical calculations feasible the number of skill
types considered is kept to a minimum. Since these three occupation codes are slightly
problematic, and also a small portion of the sample, they are dropped to facilitate the
numerical calculations.
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penditures on various categories such as food, apparel, entertainment, hous-
ing and transportation. The CES also reports consumption information on
the actual items that comprise each category. In the model households con-
sume a composite clean good, a composite energy good and leisure. The
energy good consists of gasoline and home energy consumption – electricity,
natural gas or home heating fuels and oils.4 The clean good expenditure is
the difference between total household expenditures and the energy good.
Leisure is separated into male leisure and female leisure if the household is
married and both spouses work. The CES reports quarterly expenditures,
however the analysis is based on weekly expenditures. Therefore the quar-
terly data is converted to weeekly data by assuming thirteen weeks in a
quarter.
The CES reports annual salary as well as hours worked per week and
weeks worked per year, which is used to calculate a hourly gross wage rate.
The NBER TaxSim program5 is used to calculate effective state and federal
marginal income tax rates, which are then used to calculate a hourly net
wage rate. The leisure expenditure is calculated by multiplying hours of
leisure by the net wage rate. Hours of leisure is constructed by assuming each
individual has a daily time endowment of 14 hours per day and works five days
a week, for a weekly time endowment of 70 hours.6 In the optimal income
tax model of Mirrlees, individuals have an earnings ability, or maximum
earnings potential, based on their time endowment and wage rate. This time
endowment is supposed to capture the household’s labor-leisure decision.7
4A small number of households, 826, have zero energy expenditures. It is possible
for households to have zero gasoline expenditures, since not all households own automo-
biles. However since all households in the data set own or rent a home or apartment,
all households should have some energy expenditure. Only 2.66% of these zero energy
households own a home. It seems reasonable to assume these 826 households do actually
consume energy. However since almost all rent, perhaps utilities is included in the rent.
Therefore households who report zero energy consumption are dropped since actual energy
consumption most likely does not equal reported consumption.
5www.nber.og/taxsim
6Three hundred seventy-six households are found to have zero or negative leisure hours
because their weekly hours worked exceeds the time endowment. Since such a small
percentage of households bind at the time endowment, these households are dropped.
Some households have both zero energy and zero leisure expenditures and therefore only
1,186 households are dropped for a final sample size of 42,330 households.
7An individual can allocate their time between labor (taxable work), leisure and non-
taxable work. From a taxation perspective, the government wants to distinguish labor from
leisure since leisure is considered a commodity good. Therefore it is important to identify
between labor, leisure and non-taxable work. However it is not possible to separate leisure
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The sample is separated into married and single households to account
for differing labor supply responses. In addition the married households are
separated into households where both spouses work and households where
only one spouse works. This is to account for the possibility that households
where only one spouse works behave differently than households where both
spouses work. In the case of married households with only one working
spouse, leisure demand is only estimated for the working spouse.
The CES only reports information on expenditures. Therefore data on
prices comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The BLS “all-items-less-
energy” price index is used as the clean good price and the “energy” price
index is used as the energy good price.8 The indices are divided by 100 so
that prices are equivalent to a dollar price. Both price indices are national
indices reported on a monthly basis. Since the CES reports expenditures
on a quarterly basis, quarterly prices are calculated to correspond to each
household’s three-month reporting period.
Table 2.1 reports summary statistics for single households and married
households with one working spouse. Table 2.2 reports summary statistics
for married households where both spouses work. Single households spend
only 5.26% of their weekly budget on energy consumption, $35.07 out of total
weekly expenditures of $761.78. In addition, 72.04% of single households
have no children, while only 38.99% own a home and slightly more than
half, 51.83%, own one car. Married households with one working spouse
spend approximately 6.32% of their weekly budget on energy consumption
while married households with two working spouses spend only 4.72%. The
number of hours worked between the earner in the one working spouse sample
and the male earner in the married with two working spouses sample, are
very similar – 43.17 hours for the former and 44.10 for the latter, while the
former earner earns $1 more per hour. The earner in the married households
with one working spouse sample earns $11.57 per hour while the male earner
in the married households with two working spouses sample earns $10.47.
Home ownership rates are approximately the same for the two married
household samples – 71.80% for those with one working spouse and 79.43%
from non-taxable work with the data available. Non-taxable work is therefore assumed to
be zero.
8Appendix 3, Chapter 17 of the BLS Handbook of Methods lists the components of var-
ious aggregate price indices. The “energy” price index is comprised of gasoline, electricity,
natural gas and home heating fuels and oils.
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for those with two working spouses. The former households are more likely
to have three or more children – 20.50% for married households with one
working spouse and 12.06% for married households with two working spouses.
In the case where only one spouse works, the earner is the husband in 75.67%
of the sample. Married households with one working spouse are more likely
to own either zero cars, 19.52% versus 15.14%, or own only one car, 45.09%
versus 42.11%.
2.3 Almost Ideal Demand System
2.3.1 Almost Ideal Demand System Model
Stone’s (1954) linear expenditure system was the first demand system model
derived from demand theory.9 Previous models estimated demand for goods
equation by equation in order to calculate price elasticities. This allowed
for demand equations to be tailored to specific items, however it did not
allow for demand theory to be tested. The motivation behind incorporating
demand theory was one of degrees of freedom, there were more parameters to
be estimated than observations. Stone imposed demand theory restrictions
– additivity, homogeneity and symmetry – in order to reduce the number
of parameters that needed to be estimated. Since the demand restrictions
are needed to estimate the equations, it was not possible for Stone to test
demand theory with his linear expenditure model. The Rotterdam model of
Theil (1965) is the model most often used to test demand theory. The model
is very similar to Stone’s linear expenditure system. The main difference is
that the model does not have to impose the assumptions of homogeneity and
symmetry in order to be estimated, and therefore these two assumptions can
be tested.
Diewert (1971) began a new approach to demand estimation, the use of
“flexible functional forms.” The idea is to specify an equation with enough
parameters so that it can approximate the true direct or indirect utility func-
tion or the cost function. Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau (1975) develop the
“transcendental logarithmic” model, or trans-log model, to be a second-order
9A more detailed summary of the major demand system models is found in chapter 3,
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b)
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Single Households Married, 1 Worker
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev
Clean Good Exp ($) 492.29 394.41 703.81 583.21
Energy Good Exp ($) 35.07 23.83 55.33 28.26
Leisure Exp ($) 234.42 188.85 303.33 249.98
Total Expenditures ($) 761.78 469.89 1,062.48 707.85
Clean Good Share (%) 61.95 15.73 64.08 13.97
Energy Good Share (%) 5.26 3.49 6.32 3.68
Leisure Share (%) 32.79 15.95 29.59 13.88
Clean Good Price ($) 1.69 0.04 1.69 0.04
Energy Good Price ($) 1.07 0.04 1.07 0.04
Hourly Gross Wage ($) 12.92 8.93 18.02 13.42
Marginal Tax Rate (%) 33.35 18.04 32.24 16.09
Hourly Net Wage (%) 7.94 5.08 11.57 8.09
Hours Worked (Wkly) 40.05 10.30 43.17 9.29
Hours Leisure (Wkly) 29.95 10.30 26.83 9.29
Ln(Clean Price) ($) 0.52 0.03 0.52 0.03
Ln(Energy Price) ($) 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.04
Ln(Net Wage) ($) 1.89 0.67 2.22 0.74
Ln(Real Income ($) 5.51 0.55 5.77 0.55
Age 37.00 11.80 43.21 10.90
No HS Diploma (%) 9.22 – 19.13 –
HS Diploma (%) 27.05 – 29.70 –
Some College (%) 36.47 – 24.54 –
Bachelor’s Degree (%) 19.07 – 16.43 –
Graduate Degree (%) 8.19 – 10.20 –
Male (%) 42.06 – 75.67 –
White (%) 80.07 – 87.58 –
Black (%) 15.32 – 6.39 –
Asian (%) 3.49 – 3.93 –
Other (%) 1.12 – 2.10 –
No Children (%) 72.04 – 35.42 –
One Child (%) 13.85 – 19.31 –
Two Children (%) 9.00 – 24.76 –
Three or More (%) 5.11 – 20.50 –
Own Home (%) 38.99 – 71.80 –
No Cars (%) 30.32 – 19.52 –
One Car (%) 51.83 – 45.09 –
Two Cars (%) 13.51 – 25.39 –
Three or More (%) 4.33 – 10.00 –
# of Observations 19,881 – 6,482 –
*Data is from the 1996 – 1999 CES data set. The energy good is
gasoline, electricity, natural gas and home heating fuels and oils.
The clean good is remaining household expenditures.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics Married Households, 2 Workers
Male Female
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev
Clean Good Exp ($) 866.0903 565.01 – –
Energy Good Exp ($) 60.11 27.88 – –
Leisure Exp ($) 270.88 188.86 256.98 210.36
Total Expenditures ($) 1,454.06 713.65 – –
Clean Good Share (%) 57.76 12.94 – –
Energy Good Share (%) 4.72 2.50 – –
Leisure Share (%) 19.37 9.83 18.15 9.85
Clean Good Price ($) 1.69 0.04 – –
Energy Good Price ($) 1.07 0.04 – –
Hourly Gross Wage ($) 17.72 10.52 13.36 8.89
Marginal Tax Rate (%) 39.30 9.29 – –
Hourly Net Wage (%) 10.47 5.98 7.85 4.95
Hours Worked (Wkly) 44.10 8.46 37.27 10.30
Hours Leisure (Wkly) 25.90 8.46 32.73 10.30
Ln(Clean Price) ($) 0.52 0.03 – –
Ln(Energy Price) ($) 0.07 0.04 – –
Ln(Net Wage) ($) 2.18 0.65 1.87 0.70
Ln(Real Income ($) 6.04 0.47 – –
Age 41.07 9.85 39.19 9.47
No HS Diploma (%) 9.22 – 7.61 –
HS Diploma (%) 28.83 – 29.23 –
Some College (%) 29.02 – 32.67 –
Bachelor’s Degree (%) 20.84 – 20.82 –
Graduate Degree (%) 12.08 – 9.66 –
White (%) 87.67 – 87.72 –
Black (%) 7.30 – 6.81 –
Asian (%) 3.55 – 1.42 –
Other (%) 1.48 – 4.05 –
No Children (%) 38.75 – – –
One Child (%) 24.65 – – –
Two Children (%) 24.54 – – –
Three or More (%) 12.06 – – –
Own Home (%) 79.43 – – –
No Cars (%) 15.14 – – –
One Car (%) 42.11 – – –
Two Cars (%) 30.45 – – –
Three or More (%) 12.29 – – –
# of Observations 15,893 – – –
*Data is from the 1996 – 1999 CES data set. The energy good is
gasoline, electricity, natural gas and home heating fuels and oils.
The clean good is remaining household expenditures.
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approximation to any utility function. The benefit of this model is that it is
derived from a class of utility functions that does not assume additivity and
homotheticity. Additive and homothetic utility functions imply consistent
and identical elasticities of substitution between any two commodities.
The Almost Ideal Demand System model of Deaton and Muellbauer is
used to estimate demand. The AIDS model follows the “flexible functional
form” tradition of Diewert and can be considered a first-order approximation
to any demand system. The foundation of the AIDS model is the PIGLOG,
“price-independent generalized logarithmic” class of preferences. Demand
system estimation faces two different aggregation problems. The first is how
to aggregate over commodities and the second is consistent aggregation over
consumers. Muellbauer (1975, 1976) considers the latter problem and finds
the most general conditions for which consistency holds, which he labels
“generalized linearity.” The consistency problem of aggregating over con-
sumers is to find some representative level of income, such that the budget
share for the ith commodity, based on prices p and this representative level
of income, is equivalent to the average budget share for commodity i.10 How-
ever if this representative level of income is to be independent of prices, then
the PIGL, “price-independent generalized linearity” class of preferences is
required. PIGLOG is the logarithmic version of PIGL. Therefore the AIDS
model exactly aggregates over all consumers. In addition, the AIDS model
satisfies the axioms of choice and can be used to test the demand theory
restrictions of homogeneity and symmetry. The AIDS model also does not
impose separability, which is the primary benefit of the estimation procedure
for optimal taxation purposes.
The AIDS cost function is the following:
ln(c(u, p)) = (1− u)× ln(a(P )) + u× ln(b(P )) (2.1)
10According to Muellbauer (1975), define y0 to be some representative level of income
and p to be the vector of prices. If s¯i is the average budget share for good i, then consistent
aggregation occurs when
s¯i = si(y0, p)
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where
ln(a(P )) = α0 +
n∑
i=1
αi × ln(pi) + 1
2
×
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
γi,j × ln(pi)× ln(pj) (2.2)
ln(b(P )) = ln(a(P )) + β0 ×
n∏
i=1
pβii (2.3)
ln(a(P )) and ln(b(P )) are two different price indices and u is utility. Deaton
and Muellbauer suggest that ln(a(P )) be interpreted as the cost of subsistence
and ln(b(P )) be the cost of bliss. The functional forms for ln(a(P )) and
ln(b(P )) are determined by the conditions needed for exact aggregation over
consumers to hold. Muellbauer finds that the cost function, in the PIGLOG
and PIGL models, consists of two different price indices. In addition, one
of the price indices must be homogeneous of degree zero, ln(a(P )), and the
other must be homogeneous of degree one, ln(b(P )).
Deaton and Muellbauer derive the following AIDS demand function for
good i from the cost function.
si ≡ pi × xi
M
= αi +
n∑
j=1
γi,j × ln(pj) + βi × ln M
a(P )
(2.4)
for i = 1, ..., n. In the model, n is either 3 or 4 depending on the number of
workers in the household. si is the budget share for good i, pi is the price of
good i, xi is demand for good i. M is total income and is defined as
M = ω +m (2.5)
where ω is earnings ability, or value of the time endowment, and m is virtual
income. Earnings ability is calculated as the average household net wage rate
× time endowment. The tax structure is non-linear, however in the model
tax rates are assumed to be linear. Virtual income is the lump-sum transfer
amount needed to ensure that tax payments are equivalent between the true
non-linear tax regime and the assumed linear tax regime. αi, βi and γi,j are
parameters to be estimated.
If the actual price index, ln(a(P )), is substituted into the demand func-
tion, then non-linear estimation is required. Deaton and Muellbauer suggest
approximating this price index with Stone’s Index in order to keep the esti-
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mated equation linear in parameters.11 Stone’s Index is defined as follows:
ln(P ∗) =
n∑
i=1
si × ln(pi) (2.6)
The following restrictions are imposed:
n∑
i=1
αi = 1;
n∑
i=1
γi,j = 0;
n∑
i=1
βi = 0 (2.7)
n∑
j=1
γi,j = 0 (2.8)
γi,j = γj,i (2.9)
The first set of restrictions ensures adding up of the budget constraint. The
second restriction, eq. (2.8), ensures homogeneity of degree zero and the last
restriction imposes Slutsky symmetry.
2.3.2 Almost Ideal Demand System Estimation Procedure
The model suffers from two primary sources of endogeneity. The first is that
the net wage rate is endogenous. The marginal tax rate, which is used to
calculate the net wage rate, is based on household income. The second source
of endogeneity is the real income term, M
a(P )
. Stone’s Index, which is used
to approximate ln(a(P )), is a function of budget shares. Therefore the real
income term is now a function of the dependent variable.
The econometric procedure of West and Williams (2004, 2007) is followed.
They use the 1996-1998 CES data set and the AIDS model to estimate the
cross-price elasticity of leisure with respect to gasoline as well as calculate
the optimal gasoline tax. Instruments for the net wage rate and the real
11West and Williams use a slightly different version of Stone’s Index, which uses ln(pip¯i )
in place of ln(pi), where p¯i is the sample average price for good i. Moschini (1995) raises
the concern that if prices are not unit-invariant, then Stone’s Index is not a satisfactory
approximation for the ln(a(P )) price index. Moschini suggests using a “corrected” Stone’s
Index, such as one where “prices are scaled by their mean,” which is what West and
Williams do. However, Moschini makes the point that if prices are indices, then it is
equivalent to using a “corrected” Stone’s Index. In this analysis, the clean good and
energy good prices are price indices. Nevertheless, the analysis is repeated using prices
scaled by their means, however the results are less robust and thus the original Stone’s
Index is used.
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income term are created. The instrument for the net wage rate is a sample
average net wage rate based on occupation–, state–, gender-specific sample
cells. The instrument for Stone’s Index is an alternative version calculated
using sample average budget share values for each good in place of individual
budget share values.
Error terms are potentially correlated across equations since the right-hand
side variables are identical. Therefore a three-stage least squares procedure is
used to estimate the model. The procedure combines 2SLS with a seemingly
unrelated regression model. The SUR model controls for the endogenous
error term by taking into account the correlated error structure and also al-
lows the imposition of the cross-equation restrictions. The 2SLS component
allows for the use of instruments in controlling for endogeneity. The demo-
graphic variables included are age, age squared, education dummy variables,
ethnicity dummy variables, marital status, dummy variables for the number
of children, a dummy variable for home ownership, dummy variables for the
number of cars owned and state and month fixed effects.
The energy good is a combination of gasoline consumption and home en-
ergy consumption. Dummy variables for home ownership and the number
of cars are included to control for energy consumption differences based on
owning versus renting and whether one drives. State fixed effects are in-
cluded to control for differences in energy consumption across states. Public
transportation is used regularly in New York City and Washington D.C.,
while driving is essential in the West. Cities such as Denver and Seattle
have strong bicycling cultures. Weather also differs by region. Month fixed
effects are included to control for seasonal variation in energy consumption
– heating and air-conditioning increase energy consumption in the winter
and summer months, while families may drive more during the summer for
family vacations. Cross-sectional wage variation, within each state, is used
to estimate the cross-price elasticity of labor supply and variation in prices
over time is used to estimate the cross-price elasticity of the energy good.
The clean good equation is dropped in the estimation procedure and the
parameters are calculated from the cross-equation restrictions. The esti-
mated parameters for single households are reported in Table 2.3, married
households with one working spouse are reported in Table 2.4 and married
households with two working spouses are reported in Table 2.5. The stan-
dard errors are calculating using a bootstrap procedure, 1,500 replications.
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Since the same household may appear in up to four consecutive quarters, the
bootstrap procedure takes into account potential correlation of households
across quarters. The coefficient on the real income term, βi, is positive for
luxuries and negative for necessities since the demand is measured in bud-
get shares and not quantity. The clean good is the only luxury good – βc is
0.1632 for single households, 0.1474 for married households with one working
spouse and 0.1731 for married households with two working spouses. βi is
negative for the energy good and leisure for all three samples.
The law of demand indicates that as price increases, the quantity de-
manded should decrease. Although the own-price parameter estimates for
each equation are always positive for all three samples, this does not neces-
sarily contradict the law of demand again because the dependent variable is
budget shares. For instance the clean good price parameter for the clean good
equation in Table 2.3 is 0.0565, which means that the share of clean good
consumption rises when the clean good price increases. This implies that the
price increase dominates the quantity decrease. If the share of clean good
consumption rises then the shares of the other two goods have to decrease
and this is what the parameters indicate. For single households, the clean
good price parameter is –0.0218 for the energy good equation and –0.0347
for the leisure equation.
A similar effect is found for the prices of the other goods in the other
samples. For married households with one working spouse (Table 2.4), the
energy good price parameter is 0.0473 for the energy good equation, so the
share of the energy good consumed increases. Similarly the energy good
price parameter is –0.0258 for the clean good and –0.0214 for leisure, so the
share of the other goods falls. Deaton and Muellbauer suggest the following
interpretation for the price parameters:
“each γi,j represents 10
2 times the effect on the ith budget share
of a 1% increase in the jth price.”
Consider the parameter estimates for married households with two working
spouses in Table 2.5, the own-price parameter for male net wage is 0.0689,
which means that a 1% increase in net wage for husbands leads to a 0.000689
increase in the share of leisure consumed by the husband. This creates a
0.000150 decrease in the share consumed of the clean good, a 0.000079 de-
crease in the share consumed of the energy good and a 0.000460 decrease in
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Table 2.3: Three-Stage Least Squares Estimates For Single Households
(AIDS)
Clean Good Energy Good Leisure
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
Constant –0.3469‡ (0.0216) 0.1719‡ (0.0071) 1.1750‡ (0.0222)
Ln(Clean Price) 0.0565‡ (0.0107) –0.0218‡ (0.0057) –0.0347‡ (0.0092)
Ln(Energy Price) –0.0218‡ (0.0057) 0.0358‡ (0.0049) –0.0140‡ (0.0028)
Ln(Net Wage) –0.0347‡ (0.0092) –0.0140‡ (0.0028) 0.0487‡ (0.0097)
Ln(Real Income) 0.1632‡ (0.0032) –0.0204‡ (0.0010) –0.1428‡ (0.0033)
Age 0.0055‡ (0.0008) 0.0020‡ (0.0002) -0.0075‡ (0.0008)
Age Sq –0.0001‡ (0.00001) –0.00002‡ (0.000003) 0.0001‡ (0.00001)
No HS Diploma –0.0058 (0.0041) –0.0012 (0.0014) 0.0070 (0.0043)
Some College –0.0063† (0.0028) –0.0048‡ (0.0009) 0.0111‡ (0.0029)
Bachelor’s Deg 0.0028 (0.0039) –0.0064‡ (0.0012) 0.0036 (0.0040)
Graduate Deg 0.0050 (0.0054) –0.0095‡ (0.0016) 0.0045 (0.0057)
Male 0.0078‡ (0.0025) 0.0046‡ (0.0008) –0.0124‡ (0.0027)
Black –0.0063† (0.0029) –0.0006 (0.0010) 0.0070† (0.0030)
Asian –0.0022 (0.0066) –0.0044‡ (0.0014) 0.0066 (0.0069)
Other –0.0167 (0.0109) –0.0029 (0.0039) 0.0196 (0.0103)
Own Home –0.0195‡ (0.0028) 0.0167‡ (0.0009) 0.0028 (0.0030)
No Children 0.0006 (0.0029) –0.0084‡ (0.0010) 0.0078† (0.0031)
Two Children –0.0093† (0.0042) 0.0008 (0.0013) 0.0084 (0.0045)
Three or More –0.0158‡ (0.0055) 0.0071‡ (0.0018) 0.0086 (0.0057)
No Car –0.0025 (0.0025) –0.0066‡ (0.0007) 0.0092‡ (0.0026)
Two Cars 0.0049 (0.0027) 0.0093‡ (0.0009) –0.0142‡ (0.0029)
Three or More 0.0090† (0.0044) 0.0139‡ (0.0015) –0.0229‡ (0.0046)
*System of 3 demand equations, the clean good equation is dropped. Parameters for the
clean good are calculated based on cross-equation restrictions. Standard errors are
calculated using a bootstrap procedure (1,500 replications). † significance at 5% level.
‡ significance at 1% level.
the share consumed of leisure by the wife.
The rationale for separating married households into a sample of house-
holds with only one working spouse and a separate household with two work-
ing spouses is the belief that household behavior, especially the labor/leisure
response differs. The clean good own-price parameter is 0.0779 for house-
holds with one working spouse and 0.0700 for households with two working
spouses. The energy good own-price parameter is 0.0473 for households with
one working spouse and 0.0390 for households with two working spouses.
The leisure own-price parameter is 0.0735 for households with one working
spouse and 0.0689 for male leisure and 0.0769 for female leisure, in the case
of households with two working spouses. Except for female leisure, the own-
price parameters are larger for households with one working spouse than
households with two working spouses. The relationship for the cross-price
parameters is less clear.
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Table 2.4: Three-Stage Least Squares Estimates For Married Households, 1
Worker (AIDS)
Clean Good Energy Good Leisure
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
Constant -0.0066 (0.1074) 0.1784‡ (0.0234) 0.8282‡ (0.1018)
Ln(Clean Price) 0.0779‡ (0.0135) –0.0258† (0.0102) -0.0521‡ (0.0089)
Ln(Energy Price) –0.0258† (0.0102) 0.0473‡ (0.0100) -0.0214‡ (0.0031)
Ln(Net Wage) –0.0521‡ (0.0089) –0.0214‡ (0.0031) 0.0735‡ (0.0096)
Ln(Real Income) 0.1474‡ (0.0053) –0.0235‡ (0.0017) –0.1239‡ (0.0056)
Age –0.0012 (0.0016) 0.0032‡ (0.0005) –0.0020 (0.0017)
Age Sq 0.000001 (0.00002) –0.00003‡ (0.00001) 0.00003† (0.00002)
No HS Diploma -0.0030 (0.0055) –0.0020 (0.0023) 0.0051 (0.0058)
Some College 0.0078 (0.0053) –0.0038† (0.0018) –0.0040 (0.0057)
Bachelor’s Deg 0.0173† (0.0071) –0.0030 (0.0024) –0.0143 (0.0076)
Graduate Deg 0.0164 (0.0085) –0.0055 (0.0029) –0.0109 (0.0094)
Male -0.0750 (0.0987) 0.0086 (0.0178) 0.0664 (0.0914)
Black -0.0075 (0.0088) –0.0033 (0.0033) 0.0108 (0.0092)
Asian -0.0028 (0.0098) –0.0117‡ (0.0030) 0.0144 (0.0106)
Other 0.0008 (0.0190) -0.0087 (0.0051) 0.0080 (0.0190)
Own Home -0.0154‡ (0.0049) 0.0162‡ (0.0019) –0.0008 (0.0052)
No Children -0.0061 (0.0059) –0.0034 (0.0022) 0.0095 (0.0063)
Two Children 0.0087 (0.0051) –0.0003 (0.0018) –0.0085 (0.0055)
Three or More -0.0044 (0.0058) 0.0006 (0.0020) 0.0037 (0.0061)
No Car 0.0051 (0.0051) –0.0039‡ (0.0018) –0.0012 (0.0053)
Two Cars 0.0025 (0.0043) 0.0061‡ (0.0016) –0.0086 (0.0046)
Three or More 0.0035 (0.0059) 0.0083‡ (0.0020) –0.0118 (0.0064)
*System of 3 demand equations, the clean good equation is dropped. Parameters for the
clean good are calculated based on cross-equation restrictions. Standard errors are
calculated using a bootstrap procedure (1,500 replications). † significance at 5% level.
‡ significance at 1% level.
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2.3.3 Almost Ideal Demand System Elasticity Calculations
The AIDS model does not directly estimate elasticities. The elasticity for-
mulas are derived by taking the derivative of the budget share equation with
respect to prices and then algebraically manipulated. Note that the elastic-
ity formulas are derived from equation 2.2 where the AIDS equation includes
the true price index, ln(a(P )). However the parameters are estimated with
Stone’s Index as a proxy for ln(a(P )). This raises the issue of whether esti-
mation with Stone’s Index yields parameters consistent with the true AIDS
model. Green and Alston (1990) derive an alternative elasticity formula
based on estimating the AIDS equation with Stone’s Index. They find that
as the error from using Stone’s Index approaches zero, the estimated param-
eters will converge to the true parameters except for the αi intercept terms.
This is consistent with the finding of Buse (1994); parameters estimated us-
ing Stone’s Index may be combined with the AIDS elasticity formulas as long
as αi is corrected. Moschini (1995) examines whether or not Stone’s Index is
an adequate approximation to ln(a(P )). If prices are not unit-invariant then
Stone’s Index is a poor approximation. Therefore Moschini suggests alterna-
tive specifications which are unit-invariant. Alternatively if prices are already
indices then Stone’s Index is sufficient.12 Therefore the elasticity formulas
based on ln(a(P )) are used. The benefit is that this keeps the elasticity for-
mulas consistent with the tax incidence calculations, since the indirect utility
function is based on the ln(a(P )) formula.
The uncompensated AIDS elasticity formula is:
i,j =
1
wi
[γi,j − βi × (αj +
n∑
k=1
γk,j × ln(pk))]− δi,j (2.10)
where δi,j is the Kronecker delta. Labor supply is assumed to be endogenous
and this affects the cross-price elasticities with respect to the net wage rate.
i,l =
1
wi
[γi,l + βi × ω
M
− βi × (αl +
n∑
k=1
γk,l × ln(pk))] + ω
M
− δi,l (2.11)
In the four good model where male and female leisure are separate, ω is
spouse-specific earnings ability.
12Green and Alston’s elasticity formulas are used to calculate elasticity values. However
the formula yields a positive compensated own-price elasticity for leisure which is incorrect.
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Since the elasticity formulas are derived using the ln(a(P )) price index, but
Stone’s Index is used in the estimation process, the αi’s need to be adjusted.
An iterative procedure is used to calculate the αi’s. The estimated αi values
are used to calculate ln(a(P )). Given a value for the price index, an estimated
budget share value can then be found. The αi values are calibrated so that
this estimated budget share value matches the sample average budget share
value for each good.13
Table 2.6 reports elasticities for single households, Table 2.7 reports elastic-
ities for married households with one working spouse and Table 2.8 reports
elasticities for married households with two working spouses. The income
elasticities are similar across all three samples. The income elasticity esti-
mates for the clean good are 1.2634 for single households, 1.2300 for married
households with one working spouse and 1.3000 for married households with
two working spouses, which correspond to the parameter estimates for β
indicating that the clean good is a luxury good. The energy good and la-
bor are found to be inelastic across all three samples. The compensated
own-price elasticities indicate that all of the goods have the correct inverse
price-quantity demanded relationship. For single households, the clean good
own-price elasticity is –0.2110 and the energy good own-price elasticity is
–0.2519. The compensated own-price elasticity for labor supply is supposed
to be positive, 0.3154. As the net wage rate increases, leisure should decrease
and therefore hours worked will increase.
The compensated cross-price elasticities for the single household sample are
greater in magnitude relative to the corresponding compensated cross-price
elasticities for both married household samples, except for the cross-price
elasticity between the clean good and the energy good. The compensated
cross-price elasticity of the clean good with respect to the energy good price is
0.0075 for single households, 0.0140 for married households with one working
spouse and –0.0097 for married households with two working spouses. The
compensated cross-price elasticity of the energy good with respect to the
clean price is 0.0889 for single households, 0.1414 for married households with
13Asche and Wessells (1997) examine the effect of price normalization on the AIDS
model. If prices are normalized to unity then ln(a(P )) = α0. They use this relationship to
derive an alternative elasticity formula. The Asche and Wessells elasticity formula is used
to calculate compensated cross-price elasticity values for the clean good, energy good and
labor supply. These elasticity estimates do not differ from the elasticities found by the
iterative procedure.
45
one working spouse and –0.1184 for married households with two working
spouses. These two are also the only insignificant cross-price elasticities for
the single household sample.
If the tax regime includes commodity taxation, it is important to include
leisure as one of the consumption goods. However since it is not possible
to measure leisure consumption, and therefore to tax it, an alternative is
to tax complements to leisure. Thus it is necessary to calculate the cross-
price elasticity of leisure, or alternatively labor supply. The compensated
cross-price elasticity of the energy good with respect to the net wage, for
single households, is 0.1507 and the cross-price elasticity of labor supply
with respect to the energy good price is –0.0195. Both of these estimates
imply that the energy good and leisure are substitutes. For instance, if the
energy good price increases by 1%, the amount of labor decreases by 1.95%.
This implies leisure will increase, but the quantity consumed of the energy
good decreases due to the price increase and thus leisure and the energy good
are substitutes.
The compensated cross-price elasticities are similar between the married
households with one working spouse sample and the married households with
two working spouses sample. The compensated own-price elasticity for the
energy good is –0.1748 for households with one working spouse and –0.1111
for households with two working spouses, but both estimates are insignificant.
Similar to the single household sample the compensated cross-price elasticity
of the clean good with respect to the energy good price, and vice versa, is
insignificant for both married samples. The main difference between the two
married samples is in the compensated cross-price elasticity of the energy
good with respect to the net wage. The elasticity is 0.0268 but insignificant
for married households with one working spouse. It is 0.1475 and significant
for the female net wage rate in married households with two working spouses.
The compensated cross-price elasticity of labor supply with respect to the
energy good price is insignificant for both married samples.
West and Williams estimate a similar AIDS demand model on a similar
data set, they also use the CES data set but have a different sample size.
In their demand model gasoline is the only energy good. They estimate
a demand model for single households and a demand model for married
households. Their estimate of the compensated cross-price elasticity of labor
supply with respect to the price of gasoline is –0.009 for single households
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which is similar to the estimate of –0.0195 found here. Both estimates are
significant.
There is a difference in the estimate for the compensated cross-price elas-
ticity of male labor supply with respect to the energy good price. West
and Williams calculate an elasticity of 0.007, while the elasticity calculated
here is –0.0114; both values are insignificant. One important distinction is
that West and Williams estimate the compensated own-price elasticity of
gasoline for single households to be –0.750, while here it is the compensated
own-price elasticity of the energy good which is –0.2819; both of which are
significant. In addition their estimate for married households is –0.269, which
is significant while here the estimate for married households with two work-
ing spouses is –0.1111, but it is insignificant. Therefore West and Williams
find the compensated own-price elasticity of gasoline to be more responsive
than the compensated own-price elasticity of the energy good. The difference
could arise from the definition of the energy good. There are alternatives to
driving, however it may be more difficult to lower overall home energy use.
This may especially be true if energy consumption is predominantly used for
home heating purposes and cooking.
2.4 Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System
2.4.1 Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System Model
The AIDS model assumes demand equations are linear in log income. Banks,
Blundell and Lewbel (1997) test this Working-Leser Engel curve specifica-
tion and find that it holds for some, but not all goods. If Engel curves are
indeed non-linear, then it is important for any demand system to be able
to incorporate the differing income effects from households having different
incomes. Banks, Blundell and Lewbel develop the Quadratic Almost Ideal
Demand System (QUAIDS) as an extension to AIDS with this goal in mind.
Banks, Blundell and Lewbel find that the linear in log income specification
is valid for some goods but not all. They develop their QUAIDS model to be
flexible enough so that a higher-order log income term need not be imposed
on all goods. Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel find that if the Engel curve
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Table 2.6: Elasticity Estimates For The AIDS Model
Estimates For Single Households
Clean Price Energy Price Net Wage
Compensated Elasticities
Clean Good –0.2110 0.0075 0.1779
(–0.2482, –0.1738) (–0.0109, 0.0259) (0.1450, 0.2108)
Energy Good 0.0889 –0.2519 0.1507
(–0.1285, 0.3063) (–0.4344, –0.0694) (0.0427, 0.2587)
Labor –0.2873 –0.0195 0.3154
(–0.3336, –0.2410) (–0.0324, –0.0066) (0.2668, 0.3640)
Uncompensated Price Elasticities
Clean Good –0.9937 –0.0589 0.7104
(–1.0276, –0.9598) (–0.0773, –0.0405) (0.6802, 0.7406)
Energy Good –0.2905 –0.2841 0.4088
(–0.4998, –0.0812) (–0.4668, –0.1014) (0.3096, 0.5080)
Labor –0.0259 0.0026 0.1375
(–0.0667, 0.0149) (–0.0101, 0.0153) (0.0930, 0.1820)
Income Elasticities
Clean Good 1.2634
(1.2534, 1.2734)
Energy Good 0.6124
(0.5748, 0.6501)
Labor –0.4221
(–0.4368, –0.4073)
*95% confidence intervals are calculated using a bootstrapping procedure
(1,500 replications).
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Table 2.7: Elasticity Estimates For The AIDS Model
Estimates For Married Households, 1 Worker
Clean Price Energy Price Net Wage
Compensated Elasticities
Clean Good –0.1813 0.0140 0.1545
(–0.2260, –0.1366) (–0.0174, 0.0454) (0.1229, 0.1861)
Energy Good 0.1414 –0.1748 0.0268
(–0.1767, 0.4595) (–0.4856, 0.1360) (–0.0745, 0.1281)
Labor –0.2252 –0.0044 0.2334
(–0.2675, –0.1829) (–0.0178, 0.0090) (0.1882, 0.2786)
Uncompensated Price Elasticities
Clean Good –0.9695 –0.0638 0.7411
(–1.0101, –0.9289) (–0.0953, –0.0323) (0.7140, 0.7682)
Energy Good –0.2614 –0.2145 0.3265
(–0.5756, 0.0528) (–0.5252, 0.0962) (0.2387, 0.4143)
Labor 0.0063 0.0184 0.0611
(–0.0286, 0.0412) (0.0051, 0.0317) (0.0221, 0.1001)
Income Elasticities
Clean Good 1.2300
(1.2140, 1.2461)
Energy Good 0.6285
(0.5772, 0.6798)
Labor –0.3612
(–0.3843, –0.3381)
*95% confidence intervals are calculated using a bootstrapping procedure
(1,500 replications).
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Table 2.8: Elasticity Estimates For The AIDS Model
Estimates For Married Households, 2 Workers
Clean Price Energy Price Net Wage Male Net Wage Female
Compensated Elasticities
Clean Good –0.2324 –0.0097 0.1252 0.1011
(–0.2707, –0.1941) (–0.0257, 0.0063) (0.0971, 0.1533) (0.0808, 0.1214)
Energy Good –0.1184 –0.1111 0.0758 0.1475
(–0.3141, 0.0773) (–0.2645, 0.0423) (–0.0183, 0.1699) (0.0725, 0.2225)
Male Labor –0.2360 –0.0114 0.2395 0.0120
(–0.2850, –0.1870) (–0.0248, 0.0020) (0.1885, 0.2905) (–0.0170, 0.0410)
Female Labor –0.1800 –0.0076 0.0206 0.3203
(–0.2443, –0.1157) (–0.0249, 0.0097) (–0.0259, 0.0671) (0.2622, 0.3784)
Uncompensated Price Elasticities
Clean Good –0.9832 –0.0710 0.5380 0.3624
(–1.0171, –0.9493) (–0.0870, –0.0550) (0.5125, 0.5635) (0.3430, 0.3818)
Energy Good –0.4147 –0.1353 0.2387 0.2507
(–0.6011, –0.2283) (–0.2888, 0.0182) (0.1528, 0.3246) (0.1775, 0.3239)
Male Labor –0.0417 0.0045 0.1327 –0.0557
(–0.0838, 0.0004) (–0.0088, 0.0178) (0.0861, 0.1793) (–0.0851, –0.0263)
Female Labor 0.1390 0.0184 –0.1548 0.2092
(0.0842, 0.1938) (0.0013, 0.0355) (–0.1980, –0.1116) (0.1518, 0.2666)
Income Elasticities
Clean Good 1.3000
(1.2874, 1.3120)
Energy Good 0.5129
(0.4703, 0.5555)
Male Labor –0.3363
(–0.3579, –0.3148)
Female Labor –0.5523
(–0.5850, –0.5196)
*95% confidence intervals are calculated using a bootstrapping procedure (1,500 replications).
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coefficient matrix is of rank three14 and exactly aggregable then any higher-
order log income term must be quadratic, i.e. lnM2. They also find that
if they do not want to impose the non-linear specification on all goods then
either the log income or lnM2 coefficient must be price-dependent, i.e. the
value of λi varies with the price index b(P ). The estimated budget share
equation is:
wi = αi +
n∑
j=1
γi,j × ln(pj) + βi × ln M
a(P )
+
λi
b(P )
× [ln M
a(P )
]2 (2.12)
for the non-linear good only. Although Banks, Blundell and Lewbel spec-
ify the ln(a(P )) price index to be the same as the Deaton and Muellbauer
version, equation 2.2, they specify the b(P ) index slightly differently.
b(P ) =
n∏
i=1
pβii (2.13)
The estimation procedure is identical to the AIDS procedure. The only
change is the lnM2 term also needs to be instrumented for, using the same
procedure that created the log income instrument. The QUAIDS model adds
one more restriction to the list of cross-equation restrictions from before,
n∑
i=1
λi = 0 (2.14)
Tables 2.9-2.11 report the regression results from estimating both the
Working-Leser, linear in log income, Engel curve specification and the quadratic
log income specification on each good. The regression results indicate that
the quadratic log income term is significant for all goods in all three samples.
Therefore the QUAIDS model is estimated for all three goods.
14Banks, Blundell and Lewbel assume a general Engel curve specification of the form
si = Ai(P ) +Bi(P )× ln(M) + Ci(P )× g(M)
where g(M) is some non-linear function of income. This coefficient matrix has maximum
rank of 3, depending on the relationship between Bi(P ) and Ci(P )
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Table 2.9: Quadratic Polynomial Regression Results
Single Households
Clean Good Energy Good Leisure
Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic
lnM 0.0841‡ –0.1492‡ –0.0210‡ 0.0115‡ –0.063‡ 0.1376‡
(0.0020) (0.0310) (0.0004) (0.0068) (0.0021) (0.0321)
lnM2 – 0.0179‡ – –0.0025‡ – –0.0154‡
– (0.0024) – (0.0005) – (0.0024)
*Regression results test the Working-Leser Engel curve specification versus a
quadratic log income specification. † significance at 5% level. ‡ significance
at 1% level.
Table 2.10: Quadratic Polynomial Regression Results
Married Households, 1 Worker
Clean Good Energy Good Leisure
Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic
lnM 0.0551‡ –0.2265‡ –0.0337‡ –0.0761‡ –0.0214‡ 0.3027‡
(0.0030) (0.0523) (0.0007) (0.0121) (0.0030) (0.0531)
lnM2 – 0.0205‡ – 0.0031‡ – –0.0236‡
– (0.0038) – (0.0009) – (0.0038)
*Regression results test the Working-Leser Engel curve specification versus a
quadratic log income specification. † significance at 5% level. ‡ significance
at 1% level.
Table 2.11: Quadratic Polynomial Regression Results
Married Households, 2 Workers
Clean Good Energy Good Leisure (M) Leisure (F)
Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic
lnM 0.0756‡ –0.5790‡ –0.0284‡ –0.0792‡ –0.0280‡ 0.4556‡ –0.0192‡ 0.2026‡
(0.0022) (0.0473) (0.0004) (0.0081) (0.0017) (0.0369) (0.0017) (0.0373)
lnM2 – 0.0455‡ – 0.0035‡ – –0.0336‡ – –0.0154‡
– (0.0033) – (0.0006) – (0.0026) – (0.0026)
*Regression results test the Working-Leser Engel curve specification versus a quadratic log income
specification. † significance at 5% level. ‡ significance at 1% level.
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2.4.2 Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System Estimation
Results
Table 2.12 reports the parameter estimates for the single household QUAIDS
sample, Table 2.13 reports the parameter estimates for the married house-
holds with one working spouse QUAIDS sample and Table 2.14 reports the
parameter estimates for the married household with two working spouses
QUAIDS sample. First, for all three samples the AIDS and QUAIDS cross-
price parameter estimates are similar. The single household clean good own-
price parameter estimate is 0.0565 for the AIDS model (Table 2.3) and 0.0552
for the QUAIDS model (Table 2.12). The energy good own-price estimate for
the married household with one working spouse sample is 0.0473 for the AIDS
model (Table 2.4) and 0.0470 for the QUAIDS model (Table 2.13). The clean
good, male net wage cross-price parameter is –0.0150 for the AIDS model
(Table 2.5) and –0.0127 for the QUAIDS model (Table 2.14), this is for the
married households with two working spouses sample.
The difference between the AIDS and QUAIDS model is found in the
coefficient for the real income term. Consider the single household sample.
For the clean good equation the AIDS parameter estimate, 0.1632 (Table
2.3), is similar to the QUAIDS parameter estimate, 0.1845 (Table 2.12). The
estimates are different for the energy good equation. The AIDS estimate is
–0.0204 and the QUAIDS estimate is 0.0771. The difference in the leisure
equation estimate is one of magnitude. The AIDS estimate is –0.1428 and the
QUAIDS estimate is –0.2616. For the married household with one working
spouse sample, again the main difference is in the energy good equation.
However now the QUAIDS estimate is insignificant; the AIDS estimate is –
0.0235 (Table 2.4) and the QUAIDS estimate is 0.0049 (Table 2.13). For the
married household with two working spouses sample (Table 2.14), all of the
real income coefficients are insignificant for the QUAIDS model. As for the
quadratic income term, it is only significant for the energy good and leisure
and only for single households (Table 2.12). For both married household
samples, the quadratic income coefficient is insignificant for all goods.
Banks, Blundell and Lewbel developed the QUAIDS model to be flexible
enough so that the quadratic log income term does not have to be applied
to each demand equation. Therefore a mixed-QUAIDS specification is ap-
plied to the single household sample only. In this mixed-QUAIDS model, the
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Table 2.12: Three-Stage Least Squares Estimates For Single Households
(QUAIDS)
Clean Good Energy Good Leisure
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
Constant –0.4059† (0.1836) –0.1015 (0.0667) 1.5074‡ (0.1970)
Ln(Clean Price) 0.0552‡ (0.0117) –0.0204‡ (0.0059) –0.0348‡ (0.0100)
Ln(Energy Price) –0.0204‡ (0.0059) 0.0356‡ (0.0049) –0.0152‡ (0.0029)
Ln(Net Wage) –0.0348‡ (0.0100) –0.0152‡ (0.0029) 0.0500‡ (0.0104)
Ln(Real Income) 0.1845‡ (0.0640) 0.0771‡ (0.0237) –0.2616‡ (0.0691)
Ln(Real Income2) -0.0018 (0.0054) –0.0084‡ (0.0020) 0.0103 (0.0058)
*QUAIDS specification includes a quadratic log income term on all demand equations.
System of 3 demand equations, the clean good equation is dropped. Parameters for the clean
good are calculated based on cross-equation restrictions. Standard errors are calculated using
a bootstrapping procedure (1,500 replications). † significance at 5% level. ‡ significance
at 1% level.
Table 2.13: Three-Stage Least Squares Estimates For Married Households,
1 Worker (QUAIDS)
Clean Good Energy Good Leisure
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
Constant –0.1198 (0.2336) 0.0935 (0.0687) 1.0263‡ (0.2449)
Ln(Clean Price) 0.0778‡ (0.0137) –0.0253† (0.0103) –0.0525‡ (0.0090)
Ln(Energy Price) –0.0253† (0.0103) 0.0470‡ (0.0100) –0.0217‡ (0.0031)
Ln(Net Wage) –0.0525‡ (0.0090) –0.0217‡ (0.0031) 0.0741‡ (0.0097)
Ln(Real Income) 0.1854‡ (0.0642) 0.0049 (0.0220) –0.1904‡ (0.0695)
Ln(Real Income2) –0.0031 (0.0050) –0.0023 (0.0017) 0.0055 (0.0055)
*QUAIDS specification includes a quadratic log income term on all demand equations.
System of 3 demand equations, the clean good equation is dropped. Parameters for the clean
good are calculated based on cross-equation restrictions. Standard errors are calculated using
a bootstrapping procedure (1,500 replications). † significance at 5% level. ‡ significance
at 1% level.
clean good equation is estimated according to the AIDS specification and the
energy good and leisure are estimated according to the QUAIDS specifica-
tion. The results are reported in Table 2.15. Again the cross-price parameter
estimates are very similar between the AIDS and the mix-QUAIDS model.
The real income coefficient for the energy good is –0.0204 in the AIDS model
(Table 2.3) and 0.0779 in the mix-QUAIDS model (Table 2.15). The real
income coefficient for leisure is –0.1428 for the AIDS model and –0.2406 for
the mix-QUAIDS model.
2.4.3 Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System Elasticity
Calculations
The QUAIDS elasticity formulas are:
i,j =
1
wi
[γi,j − [(βi + 2λi
b(P )
× ln M
a(P )
)× (αj +
n∑
k=1
γk,j × ln(pk))]
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Table 2.14: Three-Stage Least Squares Estimates For Married Households,
2 Workers (QUAIDS)
Clean Good Energy Good
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
Constant 0.0368 (0.2697) 0.1748† (0.0734)
Ln(Clean Price) 0.0664‡ (0.0114) –0.0271‡ (0.0048)
Ln(Energy Price) –0.0271‡ (0.0048) 0.0388‡ (0.0037)
Ln(Net Wage) (M) –0.0127 (0.0084) –0.0081‡ (0.0024)
Ln(Net Wage) (F) –0.0266‡ (0.0059) –0.0036† (0.0018)
Ln(Real Income) 0.0219 (0.0859) –0.0206 (0.0233)
Ln(Real Income2) 0.0119 (0.0066) –0.0002 (0.0018)
Male Leisure Female Leisure
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
Constant 0.3163 (0.2614) 0.4721 (0.2454)
Ln(Clean Price) –0.0127 (0.0084) –0.0266‡ (0.0059)
Ln(Energy Price) –0.0081‡ (0.0024) –0.0036† (0.0018)
Ln(Net Wage) (M) 0.0674‡ (0.0087) –0.0465‡ (0.0049)
Ln(Net Wage) (F) –0.0465‡ (0.0049) 0.0768‡ (0.0061)
Ln(Real Income) 0.0165 (0.0842) –0.0177 (0.0798)
Ln(Real Income2) –0.0078 (0.0066) –0.0040 (0.0063)
*QUAIDS specification includes a quadratic log income term on all
demand equations. System of 4 demand equations, the clean good
equation is dropped. Parameters for the clean good are calculated
based on cross-equation restrictions. Standard errors are calculated
using a bootstrap procedure (1,500 replications). † significance
at 5% level. ‡ significance at 1% level.
Table 2.15: Three-Stage Least Squares Estimates For Single Households
(Mix-QUAIDS Model)
Clean Good Energy Good Leisure
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
Constant -0.3440‡ (0.0196) –0.1038 (0.0683) 1.4478‡ (0.0691)
Ln(Clean Price) 0.0522‡ (0.0078) –0.0202‡ (0.0059) –0.0320‡ (0.0050)
Ln(Energy Price) –0.0202‡ (0.0059) 0.0355‡ (0.0049) –0.0153‡ (0.0030)
Ln(Net Wage) –0.0320‡ (0.0050) –0.0153‡ (0.0030) 0.0473‡ (0.0058)
Ln(Real Income) 0.1627‡ (0.0024) 0.0779‡ (0.0242) –0.2406‡ (0.0243)
Ln(Real Income2) – – –0.0085‡ (0.0021) 0.0085‡ (0.0021)
Age 0.0053‡ (0.0007) 0.0017‡ (0.0002) –0.0071‡ (0.0007)
Age Sq –0.00007‡ (0.00001) –0.00002 (0.000003) 0.00009‡ (0.00001)
No HS Diploma –0.0057 (0.0041) –0.0007 (0.0013) 0.0064 (0.0042)
Some College –0.0065† (0.0027) –0.0047‡ (0.0009) 0.0112‡ (0.0028)
Bachelor’s Deg 0.0020 (0.0034) –0.0066‡ (0.0012) 0.0047 (0.0035)
Graduate Deg 0.0039 (0.0046) –0.0093‡ (0.0016) 0.0054 (0.0048)
Male 0.0075‡ (0.0024) 0.0047‡ (0.0008) –0.0122‡ (0.0025)
Black –0.0062† (0.0029) –0.0007 (0.0010) 0.0070† (0.0030)
Asian –0.0022 (0.0067) –0.0048‡ (0.0014) 0.0069 (0.0068)
Other –0.0168 (0.0110) –0.0023 (0.0039) 0.0191 (0.0101)
Own Home –0.0200‡ (0.0025) 0.0167‡ (0.0009) 0.0033 (0.0026)
No Children 0.0003 (0.0029) –0.0078‡ (0.0010) 0.0075† (0.0030)
Two Children –0.0093† (0.0043) 0.0008 (0.0013) 0.0085 (0.0044)
Three or More –0.0158‡ (0.0055) 0.0071‡ (0.0018) 0.0087 (0.0056)
No Car –0.0025 (0.0025) –0.0059‡ (0.0007) 0.0084‡ (0.0026)
Two Cars 0.0050 (0.0026) 0.0093‡ (0.0009) –0.0143‡ (0.0028)
Three or More 0.0094‡ (0.0042) 0.0150‡ (0.0015) –0.0244‡ (0.0044)
*QUAIDS specification includes a quadratic log income term for energy and leisure only.
System of 3 demand equations, the clean good equation is dropped. Parameters for the clean
good are calculated based on cross-equation restrictions. Standard errors are calculated using
a bootstrapping procedure (1,500 replications). † significance at 5% level. ‡ significance
at 1% level.
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− λiβj
b(P )
× (ln( M
a(P )
))2]− δi,j (2.15)
i,l =
1
wi
[γi,l + [(βi +
2λi
b(P )
(ln
M
a(P )
))× ( ω
M
− (αl +
n∑
k=1
γk,l × ln(pk)))]
− λiβl
b(P )
× (ln( M
a(P )
))2] +
ω
M
− δi,l (2.16)
Since we have a mixed AIDS/QUAIDS model the QUAIDS elasticity formu-
las are only applied to the energy good equation and the leisure equation.
Table 2.16 reports the elasticity estimates for the mix-QUAIDS model.
There are several differences between the AIDS elasticity estimates in Table
6 and these estimates. The first is that the compensated own-price elasticity
for the energy good is insignificant in the mix-QUAIDS model. Next is the
pair of compensated cross-price elasticity estimates between the energy good
and the clean good. The AIDS estimate is insignificant for both elasticities.
For the QUAIDS model both are significant. The compensated cross-price
elasticity of the clean good with respect to the energy good price is 0.0479
and the compensated cross-price elasticity of the energy good with respect
to the clean price is 0.5649, so the clean good and the energy good are sub-
stitutes. Another difference is the compensated cross-price elasticity of labor
supply with respect to the energy price. In the AIDS model this elasticity
is –0.0195 and significant. Now the mix-QUAIDS estimate is 0.0514 and in-
significant. Therefore changes in the energy price have very little effect on the
consumption of leisure, since there is no significant effect on the amount of
labor supplied. The last difference is in the income elasticity estimate. The
AIDS model finds the income elasticity for the energy good to be 0.6124,
while for the QUAIDS model it is 1.9559.
2.5 Equivalent Variation
The importance of calculating elasticities under the AIDS versus QUAIDS
specifications is best seen by examining the difference in the welfare implica-
tions of a price change. Consider the impact of a tax that increases the price
of the energy good by 25%. The welfare impact is measured by calculating
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Table 2.16: Elasticity Estimates For Mix-QUAIDS Model
Estimates For Single Households
Clean Price Energy Price Net Wage
Compensated Elasticities
Clean Good –0.2246 0.0479 0.1511
(–0.2508, –0.1984) (0.0183, 0.0775) (0.1282, 0.1740)
Energy Good 0.5649 –0.1361 –0.4683
(0.2154, 0.9144) (–0.4036, 0.1314) (–0.9629, 0.0263)
Labor –0.2495 0.0514 0.2034
(–0.2818, –0.2172) (–0.0062, 0.1090) (0.1198, 0.2870)
Uncompensated Price Elasticities
Clean Good –1.0067 –0.0184 0.6833
(–1.0321, –0.9813) (–0.0480, 0.0112) (0.6612, 0.7054)
Energy Good –0.6468 –0.2389 0.3561
(–0.8995, –0.3941) (–0.4817, 0.0039) (0.1439, 0.5683)
Labor –0.0870 0.0652 0.0929
(–0.1255, –0.0485) (0.0119, 0.1185) (0.0418, 0.1440)
Income Elasticities
Clean Good 1.2626
(1.2549, 1.2703)
Energy Good 1.9559
(1.2634, 2.6484)
Labor –0.2623
(–0.3461, –0.1785)
*95% confidence intervals are calculated using a bootstrapping procedure
(1,500 replications).
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the equivalent variation associated with the price change. The equivalent
variation is the amount of wealth needed to be given to the household to
make the household indifferent between facing the new prices or accepting
this money and staying at the original prices.
EV (p0, p1, w) = e(p0, u1)− e(p0, u0) (2.17)
= e(p0, u1)− w
where e(p, w) is the expenditure function. p0 is the original prices, u0 is the
utility level that can be achieved with wealth level w and the original prices,
p0. e(p0, u0) is the expenditure level required to achieve utility u0 at prices
p0, which is equal to w. p1 is the new price regime and u1 is the utility
level that can be achieved with the new prices and wealth level w. However
e(p0, u1) is the amount of wealth needed to achieve utility level u1, but under
the original prices p0.
The equivalent variation is negative because the price increase reduces
utility. Since households are worse off under the new prices, money must be
taken away if the household is facing the original prices. The indirect utility
function for the AIDS model15 is:
ln(v) =
ln(M)− ln(a(P ))
b(P )
(2.18)
and the indirect utility function for the QUAIDS model is:
ln(v) = [[
ln(M)− ln(a(P ))
b(P )
]−1 + λ(P )]−1 (2.19)
Table 2.17 reports the equivalent variation under the AIDS model, the
QUAIDS model and also the “bias.” The bias is the percentage difference in
the equivalent variation estimates relative to the QUAIDS estimate. The re-
sults indicate that the AIDS model overestimates welfare loss for low-income
households. For households in the 10th income percentile, the average welfare
loss is –$4.57 under the AIDS model and –$2.57 under the QUAIDS model.
15α0 in the ln(a(P)) formula is not directly estimated. Deaton and Muellbauer however
suggest a way to assign a value. α0 can be considered the minimal level of income needed
to live. Therefore the minimum value of real income is used. This is also the procedure
Banks, Blundell and Lewbel use, although they choose a value just below the minimum
sample value.
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Table 2.17: Equivalent Variation Income Distribution
Single Households Only
Income Percentiles AIDS EV ($) QUAIDS EV ($) Bias (%)
Tenth –4.57 –2.57 77.43
Twentieth –5.86 –4.09 43.18
Thirtieth –6.57 –4.95 32.75
Fortieth –7.19 –5.81 23.82
Fiftieth –7.77 –6.74 15.36
Sixtieth –8.40 –7.90 6.27
Seventieth –9.05 –9.17 –1.25
Eightieth –9.89 –11.03 –10.37
Ninetieth –11.08 –14.44 –23.29
One Hundredth –13.79 –27.55 –49.95
the opposite occurs for high-income households. For those in the 100th per-
centile, the welfare loss is –$13.79 under the AIDS model and –$27.55 under
the QUAIDS model.
2.6 Conclusion
Two different demand estimation procedures are compared – the Almost
Ideal Demand System and the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System. The
benefit of these models is neither assumes separability between consumption
goods and leisure. If commodity taxes are to be used then leisure should
be included as a consumption good. Since it is impractical to measure and
tax leisure, it is necessary to know the cross-price elasticity of leisure with
respect to other goods. The AIDS model assumes linear Engel curves and
if income effects are non-linear this biases welfare estimates. The QUAIDS
model allows for non-linear income effects by including a quadratic income
term.
Both demand systems are estimated using data from the Consumer Ex-
penditure Survey. Households are separated by marital status and also by
the number of working spouses for married households. The linear Engel
curve assumption is violated only for energy goods and leisure, and only
for the single household sample. The benefit of the QUAIDS model is that
the quadratic income specification does not have to be applied for all goods.
In the AIDS model the energy good and leisure are substitutes. In the
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QUAIDS model, the price of the energy good has no significant impact on
the amount of labor supplied and therefore no impact on the consumption
of leisure. In addition the AIDS model overestimates welfare loss for low-
income single households and underestimates welfare loss for high-income
single households. Therefore not accounting for non-linear income effects
will bias estimates of the welfare impact of environmental taxes.
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CHAPTER 3
OPTIMAL TAXATION AND JUNK FOOD
3.1 Introduction
The dual threat of rising health care costs and the obesity crisis has been on
the policy radar for some time. This is not only a health issue, but also a fiscal
issue since one of the main factors affecting the sustainability of the budget is
spending on health care. Some have looked to economics for a solution. More
specifically some have looked towards Sandmo’s “principle of targeting” as a
rationale for using taxation as a means to influence consumer behavior. The
principle of targeting suggests using the most direct tax instrument available
to influence behavior. This idea has become very popular at the policy
level with many suggesting expanding “sin taxes” to include junk food and
soft drinks in addition to the more traditional cigarettes and alcohol. This
paper estimates a three-good demand model using the Almost Ideal Demand
System of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) to calculate cross-price elasticities
and then calculates the incidence of taxing junk food. What is the impact
of a tax on junk food? Will a tax on junk food discourage consumption, or
is demand for junk food very inelastic? The latter result would indicate the
possiblity of raising significant revenue from a junk food tax that may then
be used to subsidize healthy food or healthy eating programs.
Engel’s Law describes the relationship between food expenditures and in-
come. As income increases, the share of income spent on food decreases.
However there has been less work on the cross-price elasticities between dif-
ferent types of food, in this case healthy food versus junk food. Blanciforti,
Green and Lane (1981) estimate Engel curves using a Box-Cox transforma-
tion to examine how expenditures on more nutritious and less nutritious
food varies over the life-cycle. Hawkins (2002) uses the AIDS model to
estimate the excess burden of the general sales tax. Although the model in-
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cludes expenditures on food consumed at home, it is more focused on overall
household consumption as opposed to examining food consumption. Non-
economists such as Jacobson and Brownell (2000) have argued for taxes on
soft drinks and snack foods, however they do not estimate elasticities. Heien
and Wessells (1988) use the AIDS model to estimate demand for dairy prod-
ucts, however their focus is on demand for food and not any issues related
to the taxation of unhealthy food. Chouinard, Davis, LaFrance and Perloff
(2007) estimate a generalized AIDS model on propriety data from Informa-
tion Resources Incorporated’s Infoscan scanner data, however their focus is
on dairy products only and taxing the fat that is in dairy products such as
cheese, ice cream and butter. They find demand for dairy products to be
price inelastic.
Data on household food consumption comes from the Diary Survey portion
of the Consumer Expenditure Survey. Data from the 1996 - 1999 surveys
are pooled to create a cross-sectional data set. Price data comes from the
consumer price index. Households are assumed to consume three composite
goods - a healthy food good, an unhealthy food good (junk food) and a
nonfood good. The unhealthy food good consists of items such as donuts,
cakes, ice cream, soft drinks and fruit juices that are high in sugar and/or
fats and also lack nutritional value. The healthy food good consists of items
such as bread, meat, fruits and vegetables. The AIDS model of Deaton
and Muellbauer is used to estimate household demand. The AIDS model
has many benefits. One of which is that it follows the flexible functional
form tradition of Diewert which allows it to be a first-order approximation
to any demand sytem. In addition it satisfies demand theory while not
imposing neither homotheticity nor separability. The AIDS model does not
directly estimate elasticities, rather the elasticity formulas are derived from
the estimating equation. The compensated own-price elasticities indicate
demand for both healthy food and junk food is inelastic. In addition the two
goods are found to be subsitutes.
3.2 Data Set
The data is from the Diary Survey component of the Consumer Expenditure
Survey (CES) covering the period 1996-1999. Each household is surveyed
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over a two-week period. During this time, the household records expendi-
tures on small items that would be difficult to recall over a longer time frame.
This includes expenditures on food and beverages, housekeeping supplies,
nonprescription drugs and personal care products. Household demographic
information is also collected, therefore the Diary Survey can be used inde-
pendently of the Interview Survey component of the CES.1
Data from the Diary Survey is released quarterly. The four quarters from
each year are pooled together to create a cross-sectional data set. In addition,
data from each week of the two-week household survey can be considered
to be independent. The unit of observation is the household. In order to
maintain a homogeneous population, the sample is restricted to households
where at least one spouse works. In addition, the spouses must be between
the ages of 18-65. Lastly if the occupation of the working spouse is either
armed forces, self-employed or farming, forestry & fishing then the household
is dropped from the sample.
Unlike the Interview Survey, the Diary Survey provides detailed informa-
tion on household food expenditures. Not only is expenditure data available
on such aggregate categories such as bakery products, beef, poultry, milk
products, fruits, sweets and oils etc., but detailed expenditure data is avail-
able on the subcategories. For instance, it is possible to identify the specific
food items that comprise bakery products – white bread, other bread, cakes,
cookies, donuts, etc. Similarly, expenditures on specific items in the milk
& dairy products category may be identified, such as milk, cream, butter,
cheese and ice cream. Therefore one may create very specific definitions for
the healthy food good and the junk food good. The healthy food good con-
sists primarily of breads, meats and fruits & vegetables. The junk food good
consists primarily of desserts & sweets, fats & oils as well as sugary drinks.
The focus is on all types of unhealthy food. Otherwise the tax is merely
favoring (or disfavoring in this case) certain types of unhealthy food over
other types. A tax placed only on sodas may reduce soda consumption,
1The Consumer Expenditure Survey consists of two distinct and separate components.
The first is the Diary Survey which focuses on small items and are collected during a
two-week interview period. The second is the Interview component, where households
are interviewed for five consecutive quarters on large purchases and purchases that occur
regularly. The Interview Survey component does have data on aggregate food expendi-
tures. However, only the Diary Survey component has detailed data on individual food
expenditures.
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however demand theory suggests that consumers will respond by increasing
consumption of sugary fruit juices instead. In addition, one of the principles
of good tax policy is to have a broad-based tax. Therefore from an optimal
tax perspective, one should tax all unhealthy food.2
The third good is a composite good that consists of all nonfood expen-
ditures. The Diary Survey does not have data on total household expendi-
tures,3 however the survey does have wage data so it is possible to calculate
household after-tax earnings. An hourly gross wage rate is calculated for
each household from the available employment data and the NBER TaxSim
program is used to calculate an effective marginal tax rate. This is used
to calculate a weekly after-tax earnings variable for each household. Non-
food good expenditures is then calculated as the difference between weekly
after-tax earnings and total food expenditures.4
Data on prices is available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Price in-
dices from the “all-urban-consumers” (current series) database is used. These
indices are available monthly on a national basis. The benefit of using these
prices is that the list of available prices closely matches the food categories
available in the Consumer Expenditure data set. The price indices are nor-
malized to a value of 100. Therefore the price indices are divided by 100 so
that their values correspond to actual prices.
2The healthy food composite good consists of - cereal & cereal products; bread, white
& other; meats, seafood & eggs; fresh milk; fresh fruits & vegetables; processed fruits &
vegetables, except fruit juices; coffee & tea. The junk food composite good consists of -
bakery products, except bread, white & other; cream; other dairy products; fruit juices
from processed fruits; sugar & other sweets; nonalcoholic beverages, except coffee & tea;
fats & oils; miscellaneous foods; food away from home.
3The Interview Survey does collect data on total household expenditures. However as
explained earlier, the two surveys are separate surveys with different samples that consist
of different individuals. Therefore one cannot simply merge the two surveys together,
rather the data would have to be imputed. To avoid the complications associated with
having to impute total household expenditures, household after-tax earnings is used as a
proxy.
4Note that the household faces a general income tax, whereas in the above method
the household faces a linear income tax. Moreover because of the progressive nature of
the U.S. tax system, applying the effective marginal tax rate proportionally to all income
would lead to an overestimate of taxes paid for most households. Fortunately the Diary
Survey also includes information on taxes paid by the household. This data is used to
create a “virtual income” variable that allows the linearization of a general income tax.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Age 39.55 10.92
Percent Male 59.93 –
Percent Married 61.30 –
Family Size 2.61 1.43
Healthy Food Expenditures ($) 38.07 35.65
Junk Food Expenditures 65.66 54.11
Nonfood Expenditures 777.20 573.38
Total Income 880.94 596.79
Health Food Expenditures (%) 6.11 –
Junk Food 9.65 –
Nonfood Good 84.24 –
Healthy Food Price ($) 0.53 0.37
Fatty Food Price 0.86 0.38
Nonfood Price 1.65 0.03
# of Observations 4,527 –
*Data is from the 1996-1999 CES data set.
3.3 Almost Ideal Demand System
3.3.1 AIDS Model
The foundation of demand system estimation is Stone’s (1954) linear expen-
diture system, which is derived from demand theory. In order to estimate the
linear expenditure system, it is necesary to assume that several demand the-
ory properties hold – additivity, homogeneity and symmetry. The drawback
though is that these assumptions cannot be tested. The Rotterdam model
of Theil (1965) is similar to Stone’s linear expenditure system. However the
Rotterdam model does not impose homogeneity nor symmetry, which allows
these two assumptions to be tested. The next significant contribution to
demand estimation is Diewert’s (1971) “flexible functional forms” approach.
This approach is based upon estimating equations with enough parameters
so that any direct or indirect utility function may be approximated. It is this
school of thought that led to the “transcendental logarithmic,” or trans-log,
model created by Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau (1975).
The Almost Ideal Demand System model of Deaton and Muellbauer is used
to estimate the system of household demand equations. The AIDS model
follows the “flexible functional form” approach of Diewert. The AIDS model
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has several attractive properties. This includes exact aggregation over all
consumers, as well as satisfying the axioms of choice. In addition, the AIDS
model can be used to test the demand theory restrictions of homogeneity
and symmetry. Lastly, the AIDS model does not impose separability.
The AIDS demand function for good i is as follows,
si ≡ pi × xi
M
= αi +
n∑
j=1
γi,j × ln(pj) + βi × ln M
a(P )
(3.1)
where i = 1 . . . n, here n = 3. Note that si is the budget share for good i,
pi is the price of good i, xi is demand for good i and M is total income.
ln(a(P )) is a price index and is defined as follows:
ln(a(P )) = α0 +
n∑
i=1
αi × ln(pi) + 1
2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
γi,j × ln(pi)× ln(pj) (3.2)
The above demand equation, as written, requires nonlinear estimation be-
cause of the ln(a(P )) price index. However to avoid the complications asso-
ciated with nonlinear estimation and because the AIDS model is only locally
optimal, Deaton & Muellbauer suggest approximating the price index with
Stone’s Index in order to keep the estimated equation linear in parameters.5
Stone’s Index is defined as follows:
ln(P ∗) =
n∑
i=1
si × ln(pi) (3.3)
In addition the following restrictions are imposed to ensure that the AIDS
model satisfies the adding up of the budget constraint as well as homogeneity
of degree zero. The last restriction imposes Slutsky symmetry.
n∑
i=1
αi = 1;
n∑
i=1
γi,j = 0;
n∑
i=1
βi = 0 (3.4)
5Moschini (1995) raises the concern that if prices are not unit-invariant, then Stone’s
Index is not a satisfactory approximation for the ln(a(P )) price index. Moschini suggests
using a “corrected” Stone’s Index, such as one where “prices are scaled by their mean.”
However, Moschini also raises the point that if prices are indices, then it is equivalent to
using a “corrected” Stone’s Index.
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n∑
j=1
γi,j = 0 (3.5)
γi,j = γj,i (3.6)
3.3.2 AIDS Estimation Procedure
The AIDS model suffers from endogeneity due to the real income term ln M
a(P )
.
Stone’s Index is used in place of the ln(a(P )) price index in order to keep
the model linear in parameters. However the equation involves the budget
share for each good, which also happens to be the dependent variable. The
econometric procedure of West and Williams (2004, 2007) is followed. West
and Williams use the CES data set and the AIDS model to estimate the
cross-price elasticity of leisure with respect to gasoline, as well as calculate
the optimal gasoline tax. The instrument for Stone’s Index involves replacing
individual budget shares for each good with the sample average value.
A three-stage least squares procedure is used to estimate the AIDS model.
The three-stage least squares procedure combines two-stage least squares
with a seemingly unrelated regression. The two-stage least squares proce-
dure allows the use of instruments to control for endogeneity. The seemingly
unrelated regression component is needed because error terms may be corre-
lated across equations, since the right-hand side variables are identical.
The demographic variables include age, a quadratic age term, the gender of
the household reference person, marital status, education dummy variables,
ethnicity dummy variables, home ownership dummy variable, a dummy vari-
able for children as well as season and state dummy variables. Seasonal and
state fixed effects are included to control for differences in food consumption
that may arise due to the time of the year or region. For instance, the fall
and winter months include Thanksgiving and the Christmas holidays which
is when people tend to indulge a little more. In addition there are regional
differences in diet.
Food expenditures is affected by the composition of the household. The
larger the household the cheaper groceries can become because of the ability
to buy in bulk. Alternatively, two households with the same level of income
but different family sizes cannot spend the same amount on a per-person
basis. Therefore it is important to incorporate family size into the model.
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Let z be the family size variable. Family size is incorporated into the model
in two ways – first as a demographic variable and second as an interaction
with the real income term, ln M
a(P )
. Adjust αi, βi as follows:
αi = αi + φi × z (3.7)
βi = βi + ψi × z (3.8)
Then the new AIDS budget share equation that is being estimated is:
si = αi + (φi × z) +
n∑
i=1
γi,j × ln(pj) + (βi + (ψi × z))× ln M
a(P )
(3.9)
= αi +
n∑
i=1
γi,j × ln(pj) + βi × ln
M
a(P )
(3.10)
The nonfood good equation is dropped in the estimation procedure. The
parameters for the nonfood good equation are calculated by imposing the
cross-equation restrictions. The price for the healthy food good is the meat
price index, for the junk food good it is the beverage price index and for the
nonfood good it is the ‘commodities-less-food-and-beverages’ price index.
Prices for the healthy food and junk food good are mean-centered, while the
nonfood good price is divided by 100 to convert the price index to prices.
These modifications are made because the original prices suffer from multi-
collinearity. Therefore alternative prices and several different price trans-
formations are compared in an attempt to minimize the impact of multi-
collinearity on the results. The Consumer Price Index has price indices for a
variety of food categories that is consistent with the food expenditure defi-
nitions in the Consumer Expenditure Survey. The original healthy food and
junk food good prices are composite prices which match the definition of the
healthy food good and junk food good. The ‘all-items-less-food’ price index
is originally chosen for the nonfood good. It is these three prices which are
highly correlated.
The price indices for the individual food items are considered as alter-
native prices for the healthy food good and the junk food good. Two al-
ternative composite price indices, ‘commodities-less-food-and-beverage’ and
‘commodities-less-food,’ are used for the nonfood good. The meat price in-
dex, the beverage price index and the ‘commodities-less-food-and-beverages’
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Table 3.2: Three Stage Least Squares Estimates
Healthy Food Junk Food Nonfood Good
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
Constant 0.2550 0.0166 0.4142 0.0229 0.3308 –
Ln(Healthy) –0.0021 0.0011 –0.0052 0.0013 0.0073 –
Ln(Junk) –0.0052 0.0013 –0.0094 0.0032 0.0146 –
Ln(Nonfood) 0.0073 0.0018 0.0146 0.0034 –0.0218 –
Real Income –0.0454 0.0024 –0.0491 0.0032 0.0946 –
Family Size 0.0256 0.0048 0.0377 0.0065 –0.0633 –
Interaction –0.0024 0.0007 –0.0049 0.0010 0.0073 –
*System of 3 demand equations, the nonfood good equation is dropped.
price index are found to be the best proxies for the healthy food good, junk
food good and nonfood good respectively.
In addition several price transformations are considered – prices are stan-
dardized according to the standard normal distribution, prices are mean-
centered or prices are standardized according to a normal (µ = 0.5, σ = 1)
distribution. Originally prices are scaled by dividing by 100 to convert the
price indices to a value similar to actual prices. However now if the prices
are transformed, they are not scaled. Several different transformation combi-
nations are tried, such as transforming all three prices or only transforming
two. Mean-centering the healthy food price and the junk food price while
only scaling the nonfood good price is found to yield the best results.
3.4 AIDS Elasticities
Elasticity values are indirectly estimated by the AIDS model. The relation-
ship between budget shares and quantity demanded is used to link the AIDS
equation to the elasticity formula. The income elasticity is derived as follows:
∂si
∂ lnM
∣∣∣
p
= M
∂si
∂M
∣∣∣
p
= M
∂
∂M
(pixi
M
)
. (3.11)
Which after further calculations becomes
1
si
∂si
∂ lnM
∣∣∣
p
=
M
xi
∂xi
∂M
= ηi − 1. (3.12)
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Solving for 1
si
∂si
∂ lnM
yields
ηi = 1 +
βi
si
(3.13)
A similar procedure yields the uncompensated cross-price elasticity for-
mula.
∂si
∂ ln pj
= pj
∂si
∂pj
= pj
∂
∂pj
(pixi
∂M
)
. (3.14)
which after further calculations becomes
∂si
∂ ln pj
= si (δi,j + i,j) . (3.15)
Solving for ∂si
∂ ln pj
yields
i,j =
1
si
×
{
γi,j − βi ×
(
αj +
n∑
k=1
γk,j × ln(pk)
)}
− δi,j (3.16)
where δi,j is the Kronecker delta and δi,j = 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise. Lastly
to go from uncompensated price elasticities to compensated price elasticities,
the following formula is used:
Ci,j = i,j + sj × ηi. (3.17)
These elasticity formulas are based on estimating the AIDS equation with
the ln(a(P )) price index. Estimating the AIDS equation where Stone’s Index
replaces the ln(a(P )) price index is at times referred to as the LA/AIDS
model, or linear-approximate AIDS model. Considerable research has been
done on whether the parameter estimates from the two specifications are
consistent. The question is when is Stone’s Index a good proxy for the true
price index, ln(a(P ))?
Moschini (1995) finds that if prices do not satisfy the ‘commensurability’
property, i.e. are not unit-invariant, then the two models are not consistent
and this biases estimates of γi,j and βi. Therefore Moschini suggests alter-
natives to Stone’s Index, price indices that are unit-invariant. However if
prices are already price indices then this commensurability property is not a
concern.
Even if prices satisfy the ‘commensurablity’ property, another issue re-
mains and that is the fact that the αi estimates are inconsistent between the
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two models. Green and Alston (199) and Alston, Foster and Green (1994)
compare the AIDs elasticity formula with several elasticity formulas calcu-
lated from the LA/AIDS specification. Green and Alston find that errors
do occur when combining the AIDS elasticity formula with parameter esti-
mates from the LA/AIDS model. On the other hand, parameter estimates
from the LA/AIDS equation do yield elasticity results that are consistent
with the true AIDS formula when combined with the LA/AIDS elasticity
formula. Alston, Foster and Green confirm that elasticities calculated with
the LA/AIDS formula and LA/AIDS parameters is consistent with the true
AIDS elasticities. However Alston, Foster and Green also confirm the result
of Buse (1994), which is that it is possible to correct the LA/AIDS estimate
of αi and then use the AIDS elasticity formula.
The welfare calculations require use of the true AIDS model and therefore
the second approach is followed, where the αi estimates are corrected and
then the AIDS elasticity formula is used to calculate elasticity values. The
αi estimates are adjusted by means of an iterative procedure. First the
ln(a(P )) price index is calculated using the estimated parameters. Next the
αi estimates are calibrated so that the estimated budget shares are similar
to the sample average budget shares. This procedure is repeated until there
is convergence between estimated and actual sample budget shares.
The compensated own-price elasticity estimates for both the healthy food
and junk food are inelastic, although on the high side of inelastic. Therefore
it seems that there is the possibility of discouraging junk food consumption
with a broad-based tax. Heien and Wessells estimate a demand model for
food that is focused on dairy consumption. Their compensated own-price
elasticity estimates for twelve different food items is similar to the estimates
found here. The most inelastic value they find is the compensated own-price
elasticity for margarine, which is –0.25. The own-price elasticity estimates
for the remaining goods are all larger in absolute value and range from –1.77
to –0.51. The compensated own-price elasticity value of –1.77 belongs to
fruit ades and vegetable juice, while the –0.51 value belongs to meat. Heien
and Wessells find the compensated own-price elasticity of fruit to be –0.83
while it is –0.73 for butter and –0.58 for soda.
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Table 3.3: Elasticity Estimates For AIDS Model
Health Food Price Fatty Food Price NonFood Good Price
Compensated Elasticities
Health Food –0.8170 0.1979 0.6190
Junk Food 0.1236 –0.8625 0.7389
Nonfood Good 0.0426 0.0815 –0.1241
Income Elasticities
Health Food 0.1167
Junk Food 0.3375
Nonfood Good 1.1339
3.5 Conclusion
The growing concern about obesity, and the associated obesity related health
costs, has forced politicans and policy-makers alike to consider various solu-
tions. One such solution that has gained popularity is a tax on junk food.
It is important to estimate household demand for not only junk food but
healthy food also in order to understand the implications of a junk food
tax. The Almost Ideal Demand System of Deaton and Muellbauer is used
to estimate the cross-price elasticity between healthy food and junk food as
well as the compensated own-price elasticity for both goods and also a non-
food good. The results indicate that both healthy food and junk food face
inelastic demand while healthy food and junk food are substitutes.
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